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Showing posts with label Cheonan. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Cheonan. Show all posts

Monday, October 25, 2010

Regional Update for 24 October

South Korea and the United States have canceled the planned combined naval exercise in the West Sea (Yellow Sea) scheduled for late October, South Korean state-run broadcaster KBS reported on 24 October, citing a senior South Korean official.


The decision was made in order to avoid irritating neighboring countries (really one neighboring country – China) and to improve conditions for the G20 Summit in Seoul on 11 and 12 November, Yonhap reported, citing another unnamed government source. The US aircraft carrier USS George Washington is unlikely to participate in any other combined exercises with South Korea in 2010, and the two allies will also delay the large-scale amphibious landing exercises planned for late October.

Comment (This comment is based exclusively on open source information which always is incomplete.): The cancellation appears to be a gratuitous conciliatory gesture to China to ensure its participation in the economic summit, where it is expected to be generally uncooperative, by some analysts.


The concern is that this is the second major security issue in Asia in which the US appears to have deferred to China's sensibilities, rather than assert the prerogatives of a great power.
 This cancellation would appear to negate all the brave language US spokesman have used to assert allied solidarity in confronting North Korea' aggression in sinking the South Korean corvette, Cheonan, in March. In the perception of the international community, the US backed down every time China protested the scheduling of joint exercises aimed at North Korea.


After seven months, North Korea still has gotten away with sinking an Allied patrol ship.


The second issue was the Chinese reaction to Japan's arrest of a Chinese fishing boat and crew in the Senkakus after the Chinese boat rammed a Japanese patrol boat. Only the Secretary of State stood with the Japanese against China. The rest of the US administration did not and has not.


Pro-US leaders in Asia are well advised to remember 2010 as a pivotal year for reassessing the dominant power in Asia.

Sunday, July 11, 2010

KCNA: North Korean Permanent Representative to the UN Holds News Conference on Cheonan

Korean Central Broadcasting Station carried the following in Korean during its 11:00 PM KST newscast on July 10. Additionally, The Korean Central News Agency carried the following in English under the headline "Permanent Representative of DPRK at UN Holds Press Conference" on July 10.
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Sin Son Ho, permanent representative of the DPRK at the UN, held a press conference in New York on Friday as regards the issue of the presidential statement of the United Nations Security Council on the "Ch'o'nan" case.

The press conference was attended by correspondents of various countries at the UN.

Sin Son Ho said that the UNSC could not make any proper judgment or conclusion as it hastily tabled and handled the case before the truth of the case has been probed.

The "Ch'o'nan" case should have been settled between the North and the South without referring it to the UN, he said, adding: The DPRK will probe the truth behind the case to the last.

The recent development in which the situation on the Korean Peninsula reached a point of explosion in a moment due to a conspiratorial farce once again reminds us of the danger of the present cease-fire and the urgency to establish a peace-keeping regime.

The DPRK will make consistent efforts for the conclusion of a peace treaty and the denuclearization on the peninsula through the Six-Party Talks conducted on equal footing.

Answering the questions raised by reporters, Sin said that the presidential statement of the UNSC which said it took note of the DPRK's stand that it had nothing to do with the "Ch'o'nan" case meant a diplomatic victory of the DPRK.

Saturday, July 10, 2010

South Korean Government Summons Russian Envoy to Protest Russia's Cheonan Findings

The Russian government apparently provided the findings of its investigation into the Cheonan incident to China and the US last week, leaving South Korea out of the loop. Understandably, the South Korean government summoned the Russian Ambassador to South Korea to lodge its objections on being left out of the loop on the matter.

The Russian investigation reportedly concluded that "it was unable to view the 'No. 1 torpedo' as being the cause of the sinking" of the ROKS Cheonan. Frankly, Russia's "findings" are not surprising given its past and present relations with North Korea as well as its interests in Northeast Asia - which do not necessarily coincide with the US or even China.

Below is a report from Hankyoreh by Lee Yeong-in that was filed on July 10 on this topic uner the headline, "Government Protests Russia's Conflicting Cheonan Findings":

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It came to light Friday that the South Korean government summoned the Russian Ambassador to South Korea and expressed strenuous objections over the Russian government’s failure to provide notification of the findings of its independent team that investigated the Cheonan sinking. The team was dispatched to South Korea around one month ago and concluded that it was unable to view the “No. 1 torpedo” as being the cause of the sinking.

According to military and foreign affairs supports connected to Russia, the Russian government provided notification of its independent investigation results only to the Chinese and U.S. governments last week, and South Korea only found out about the content indirectly through those two countries.

Following this, 1st Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade Shin Kak-soo summoned Russian Ambassador to South Korea Konstantin Vnukov to the Foreign Ministry on July 4 to express “astonishment” at Russia’s investigation findings because the findings were a complete contradiction to the South Korean government’s announcement. They also expressed severe dismay about the fact that Russian notified only the U.S. and China about the findings, while leaving South Korea out of the communication loop.

Foreign affairs sources reported that Shin used forceful and diplomatically irregular language to denounce Russia’s behavior, calling it “unfriendly conduct that violates trust,” “bewildering,” and “disappointing.” It was also reported to Shin proposed additional discussions with Russia during the meeting, and that the South Korean government subsequently provided additional information to the Russian government.


“Was it not the South Korean government that provided assistance to the Russian investigation, saying that they would be objective?” asked a former senior official in foreign affairs and national security, adding that the Russian investigation results “raise fundamental doubts about the [South Korean] government’s announcement of its Cheonan investigation findings.”

It was reported that while the Russian investigation team did conclude that the Cheonan was not sunk by a North Korean bubble jet torpedo, it did not present any definitive conclusions about the direct cause, suggesting several possible scenarios such as a secondary mine explosion following a problem with the Cheonan during its maneuvers. Analysts are interpreting this as being due to the fact that the Russian team, made up of submersible and torpedo experts, focused its examination on the question of whether the sinking resulted from a strike by the “No. 1 torpedo.”

“The Russian investigation team’s primary interest was in whether North Korea, which had been unable to produce its own torpedoes until 1995, suddenly was able to attack the Cheonan with a state-of-the-art bubble jet torpedo,” said a South Korean diplomatic source.

Indeed, the technology for bubble jet torpedoes, which are capable of splitting a vessel in two through the expansion and contraction of a bubble resulting from a powerful explosion, is possessed only by the U.S. and a small number of other countries, and has only been successful to date in experiments on stationary ships rather than actual fighting. The joint civilian-military investigation team also acknowledged in its June 29 briefing to media groups that North Korea was the first to have succeeded in using a bubble jet torpedo in the field.

Wednesday, June 9, 2010

North Korea sends a Letter to the UNSC and wants a New Investigation into the Cheonan Incident

(From Yonhap News Agency in English, published June 9; By Sam Kim)
SEOUL - North Korea said Wednesday [9 June] it has sent a letter to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to urge a new probe into the sinking of a South Korean warship in March, warning of "serious" consequences if punishment against Pyongyang is discussed.


The North is accused of sinking the 1,200-ton South Korean corvette and killing 46 seamen on March 26 near the Yellow Sea border with South Korea. Seoul has formally requested the 15-member UNSC to discuss ways to hold Pyongyang to account, citing a multinational investigation that concluded the ship was torpedoed.

"In case the unilaterally forged 'investigation result' is put on the agenda of the United Nations Security Council ... it will be more than clear that the sovereignty and security of (North Korea) is infringed upon," a letter by Sin Son-ho, permanent North Korea representative at the U.N., was quoted as saying by the communist state's official Korean Central News Agency.

"By then, no one would dare imagine how serious its consequences would be with regard to the peace and security on the Korean Peninsula," the letter, addressed to UNSC President Claude Heller and sent on Tuesday [8 June], was quoted as saying.

North Korea has threatened war if it is punished or sanctioned for the sinking, demanding Seoul accept an inspecting group from Pyongyang and verify the results of its probe in front of it.

Earlier Wednesday, the South Korean foreign ministry said a multinational team of investigators will brief the UNSC members on the outcome of their probe that found North Korea responsible.

South Korea referred the sinking to the council last week for a rebuke of Pyongyang. South Korean investigators are scheduled to depart for New York late Wednesday, a ministry official said on the condition of anonymity.

China and Russia, two of the veto-wielding UNSC members, have yet to acknowledge the results. Britain, France and the United States are also permanent members.

U.S. Cautious About U.N. Condemnation of North Korea

(From Yonhap News Agency in English, published in June 9 [Korea Time], June 8 [EDT]; By Hwang Doo-hyong)
WASHINGTON - The United States Tuesday [8 June] was cautious about how to punish North Korea for the torpedoing of a South Korean warship amid China's lukewarm position on further sanctions on its communist ally.


"Just to clarify, to be sure that you didn't mishear me, the South Korean government has sent a letter to the president of the Security Council," State Department spokesman Philip Crowley said. "We do expect the matter to come up within the council in the next couple of weeks. We would expect to have, per the South Korean request, an appropriate response from the U.N. Security Council. But what that specific response is will be a part of the upcoming debate."

Crowley was clarifying the remarks he made the previous day that the U.S. expected "a strong statement" on North Korea from the Security Council, which in some circles was interpreted as a scolding from the council presidential statement, viewed as weaker than a resolution.

* Link to the US Department of State Daily Press Briefing for June 7 (EDT) where Mr. Crowley made his "a strong statement" comment.

* Link to the US Department of State Daily Press Briefing for June 8 (EDT) that this Yonhap reporting is based on.

North Korea is already under U.N. sanctions imposed after its nuclear and missile tests.

Departing for Beijing earlier in the day to seek Chinese support for condemnation of North Korea, South Korean Vice Foreign Minister Chun Yung-woo said in Seoul that a resolution seeking additional sanctions "will not have practical benefits" as bilateral and multilateral sanctions have already been imposed on North Korea.

Chun, however, called for the Security Council to take "appropriate action" as the world body responsible for maintaining peace and stability in the world.

Chun's remarks appear to embrace the reality that China, a veto-wielding council member, has not yet officially blamed the North for the sinking of the warship Cheonan. China has only emphasized the need to "avoid conflict" and "maintain peace and stability" on the Korean Peninsula.

Many analysts believe it will take a considerable time before the council acts, whether it be non-binding presidential statement or a resolution with or without sanctions. It took about two weeks for the council to adopt resolutions against North Korea for its nuclear and missile tests.

An international team of investigators concluded last month that a North Korean mini-submarine torpedoed the Cheonan, but North Korea vehemently denies involvement and has threatened all-out war if sanctioned. The March 26 incident claimed 46 lives.

South Korea severed all ties with North Korea, except for the joint industrial complex in the North's border town of Kaesong, and is preparing for resuming propaganda broadcasting along the border after a six-year hiatus.

South Korea and the U.S. will also conduct a joint military exercise in waters near the scene of the sinking late this month in a show of force against North Korea with the participation of the aircraft carrier USS George Washington.

Russian Defense Minister says the Conclusion of the Cheonan Incident Premature; Russia will Announce its Conclusions in a Month

(From Itar-Tass in English, published on June 9)
MOSCOW-Russian specialists need another month to ascertain the cause of the destruction of a South Korean corvette in the Yellow Sea, Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov told "the Government Hour" session in a closed regime at the Federation Council upper house of the Russian parliament on Wednesday.

"Our specialists have returned from South Korea with fragments of the sunken ship and the explosive device. We need about a month to examine them and draw conclusions," chairman of the FC committee for defense and security Viktor Ozerov quoted Serdyukov as saying.

"It is premature to draw conclusions until we have processed all the information," Serdyukov added.

The South Korean warship Cheonan split asunder and sank in the Yellow Sea near the demarcation line with North Korea on March 26. Forty-six sailors perished.

A South Korean commission probing the accident, in which western experts participated, announced in May that the ship had been destroyed by a torpedo fired by a North Korean submarine.

* Note: Remainder of the Itar-Tass reporting omitted because the article shifted focus onto another topic.

(From Interfax-AVN in English, published on June 9)
MOSCOW- Russian military experts' report on an inquiry into the sinking of the South Korean corvette, the Cheonan, will be drawn up within a month, Viktor Ozerov, the Federation Council's defense and security committee chief, said, quoting Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov.


"The issue of North Korea was raised and the minister said that Russian experts have returned from South Korea, bringing in parts of the wreckage of the sunken ship and of an explosive device. The minister also said that we need about four weeks to carry the analysis through and to draw conclusions," Ozerov told journalists.

"Making conclusions would be premature before the experts process all information brought from South Korea," Ozerov said.

Thursday, May 27, 2010

Korea Institute for National Unification Researcher predicts North Korea's Third Nuclear Test in Reaction to Cheonan Situation

Following is an English translation of a piece written by Chon Song-hun, a Senior Fellow at the Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU).

This piece was printed in Korean and published on the KINU Online Series CO 10-19 in Korean.

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North Korea's Position on the Ship Cheonan Incident and Projected Future Attitude

[First part of the paper is about the official statements from South Korea and North Korea on the Cheonan incident, and those passages were not translated.]

North Korea's Projected Future Attitude

The North Korean authorities must have expected that the surprise attack by a small-sized midget submarine would remain a case of permanent unsolved mystery, if not a perfect crime. [They] must have expected that [the South Korean] Government would be at a loss due to its inability to find material evidence despite strong belief, and hoped that it would find itself in a tight dilemma due to criticism of security incapability from the conservative camp and criticism from the progressive camp calling for the withdrawal of the hostile policy toward the North.

Nevertheless, such an expectation proved futile with the announcement of the scientific, objective investigation results by an international joint investigation team. Instead, with the revelation that the sinking of Cheonan was a clear military provocation by North Korea, North Korea finds itself in a tight spot. Whenever a deception tactic to deceive a counterpart failed, North Korea used to choose a path that further deteriorated the circumstance. A case in point is that in the early 1990s when a false report to the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] turned out to be a fact, [the North] severed North-South dialogue and declared the withdrawal from the NPT [Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty]. In view of such an experience, this time, too, North Korea is likely to take an offensive reaction that damages stability on the Korean peninsula while using a strategy of offensive advancement to evade a defensive phase. Under the basic premise that the sinking of Cheonan has nothing to do with North Korea, North Korea will define the nature of all the measures it takes as a reaction in the self-defensive dimension against the international community's pressure on the North.

In the future, North Korea will attempt to incite mistrust and criticism for the [South Korean] government and create conflict among South Koreans by giving a political, economical, psychological blow by means of heightened tension through an offensive strategy toward the South. North Korean ships' infiltration of the NLL [Northern Limit Line] will continue and there is a likelihood that North-South maritime collisions may occur. As a counter offensive to South Korea's reaction, [the North] may fire surface-to-ship missiles against [the South] ships. Regarding the Kaesong Industrial Zone, [the North] would not easily close it in consideration of economic benefits and the domestic, international burdens in the aftermath of closing the zone. For the time being, [the North] will use the tactic of pressuring South Korea with the card of possible hostage-taking of the South side's workers. Nevertheless, in case the situation worsened, [we] cannot rule out the possibility that [the North] would take the measure of closing the zone.

Since strained North-South relations are inevitable for a considerable period, South Korea's internal strategy is likely to be adjusted. It appears that [the North] will promote the power-succession project, which will be concretized with the opening of the door to a powerful state in 2012, with the focus placed on the military aspect. [The North] will actually give up economic assistance from South Korea and try to find a breakthrough of economic losses from the military sector. In other words, it is likely that [the South] will create a semi-war situation with heightened confrontation against South Korea and achieve power succession amid the atmosphere of war. This is to overcome the people's discontent over the poor economy and the three-generation hereditary succession, by creating a threat of war.

In the international stage, including the United Nations, [the North] will unfold diplomatic warfare on the basis of two pillars of "North Korea's non-involvement" and "self-defensive reaction." A method that North Korean may choose to give a strong shock externally is a third nuclear test. It is expected that [the North] is highly likely to conduct a third nuclear test in a period between the conclusion of the eighth NPT evaluation meeting at the end of May and before the November US mid-term election this year.

In connection with this, [we] need to take note of the Rodong Sinmun report dated May 12 that North Korean scientists successfully conducted a nuclear fusion reaction. Nuclear fusion is a technology for manufacturing the H-bomb, which is mightier by tens or hundreds of times than the atomic bomb, whose principle is nuclear fission. [I] view that lurking behind the background of announcing North Korea's success in fusion technology is a calculation to conduct an additional nuclear test. It is expected that by carrying out a third nuclear test, which is much bigger in scale than the previous ones, [the North] will exaggerate its nuclear deterrent, implicitly showing off the fact that it has made a new nuclear warhead relying on the nuclear fusion technology.

The nuclear tests conducted in 2006 and 2009 were small-scale nuclear tests at the level of 1 kiloton and 2 kilotons, respectively. North Korea must have conducted small-scale nuclear tests with some calculation of its own, but with the West's reaction that North Korea's nuclear capabilities are nothing much, it is evaluated that [the North] plans an additional nuclear test that has much larger destructive power. In conclusion, the report of successful nuclear fusion may be a political move, and a prior ground-laying work, to conduct a third nuclear test by taking advantage of a tense atmosphere created by the Cheonan incident.

Tuesday, May 25, 2010

Kim Jong-Il: Right-Wing Mole?

An interesting piece published on Foreign Policy in Focus World Beat, Vol. 5, No. 20, 25 May 2010.

Kim Jong Il must work for the American Enterprise Institute. Or maybe it's the Heritage Foundation. The North Korean dictator doesn't talk much about his non-resident fellowship at a right-wing U.S. think tank. It might not go over well with the Politburo in Pyongyang.

But actions speak louder than words.

North Korea's sinking of the Cheonan, a South Korean ship that went down in March in the Yellow Sea near the maritime border between the two countries, is just what the right-wing doctors have ordered. Japan was looking a little squishy on the Okinawa base issue. China needed some reminders about just how rogue its erstwhile ally really is. And South Korea's conservative President Lee Myung Bak wanted confirmation that his containment approach to the north was justified.

Right on cue, Kim Jong Il torpedoed a South Korean ship, killing 46 sailors. The incident plays so much into the hands of North Korea's adversaries that some analysts have looked for other culprits, including friendly fire from either South Korea or the United States. While such speculation is interesting, it seems rather farfetched. In this age of WikiLeaks, it's hard to imagine a successful cover-up of such friendly fire. And the evidence implicating other actors is circumstantial, to say the least.

Meanwhile, Pyongyang's fingerprints are all over this one. The South Koreans have produced torpedo fragments from dredging the area where the ship sank. There's Korean lettering on the propulsion shaft that matches the font used in another North Korean torpedo the South Koreans have. And the South Koreans also matched traces of propellant to an earlier North Korean torpedo. Skeptics have challenged some of these findings, but the rebuttals in both news outlets and blogs are rather convincing.

Perhaps the South Korean government fabricated the evidence? Maybe. But South Korea was reluctant to point the finger at the north in the first place. A successful North Korean strike embarrasses the South Korean military and casts a shadow over the South Korean economy.

So, it looks as though AEI's overseas fellow is the most logical perp. As a result of his bold move, South Korea is suspending all contact with the North. Forget about trade (about a quarter of a billion dollars a year) and access to South Korean shipping lanes. Washington is backing its South Korean ally 100 percent. The hard right has been pushing for this kind of isolation policy against North Korea for some time.

Even more timely is the role the Cheonan sinking plays in U.S.-Japan relations. Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama was wavering on whether or not he should accede to U.S. pressure to build a new base in Okinawa to replace the aging Futenma Marine Corps facility. But, according to a senior U.S. official, the Cheonan incident reminded the Japanese government "that this is still a very dangerous neighborhood and that the U.S.-Japan alliance and the basing arrangements that are part of that are critical to Japan's security."

North Korea, in other words, has managed to torpedo all attempts to break the isolation of the country and reduce military tensions in the region. If the Dear Leader didn't receive under-the-table payments from John Bolton and friends, what on earth motivated such a self-destructive act? Perhaps Kim wanted to rally nationalist sentiment in the country on the eve of his son's succession to the top spot. Perhaps it was simple revenge for South Korea's firing on a North Korean ship that passed into South Korean waters last November. The maritime boundary between the two countries has been long disputed, so trespass is truly in the eyes of the beholder.

Actually, the situation is even more complicated, as Mike Chinoy points out in Forbes. When South Korean president Lee Myung Bak took office, he backtracked on his predecessor's pledge to work with North Korea to build confidence around the disputed maritime boundary. "The North was infuriated by what it saw as a deliberate belittling of accords signed by its all-powerful leader - what one western analyst described as 'sticking a finger in Kim Jong Il's eye,'" writes Chinoy. "So Pyongyang responded in a predictably belligerent fashion - by ratcheting up tensions in the disputed waters."

So, like with the Maine and the Tonkin Gulf incident, are we going to war? Fortunately, no one is calling for military retaliation against North Korea. South Koreans oppose military action by two to one, and they even support the maintenance of the south-managed Kaesong Industrial Complex, which employs 40,000 North Koreans (and would likely cost the south half a billion dollars to close). Even the Heritage Foundation is going only so far as to recommend an economic cutoff, further isolation of North Korea, and a clear condemnation in the Security Council. China remains lukewarm about any major challenge to North Korea and will do its best to throw a wet blanket over the controversy.

Washington will still try as hard as it can to pressure China into taking as hard-line a stance as possible. Other than express legitimate outrage, what would these stepped-up containment efforts achieve? About as much as Lee Myung Bak's initial hard-line posture. The North Korean government doesn't apologize when pushed up against the wall - it's content to fall back on its policy of self-reliance, or juche. And the North Korean people haven't risen up against their rulers when pushed into starvation. As Joel Wit points out in The New York Times, diplomacy remains our most viable strategy: "In the aftermath of the Cheonan sinking, the United States and South Korea must recognize that a return to dialogue would serve our interests. It is the only realistic way to rein in North Korea's objectionable activities."

This isn't a particularly palatable message right now in Seoul. And it probably won't go down very well here in Washington. But after a couple months of denunciations and attempted arm-twisting, it would be best if the countries involved in the Six Party talks take this advice to heart. If we want to prevent any future Cheonans, we need to sit down with North Korea. The last thing we want is a regime with nothing to lose - and plenty of weapons - to go out in a blaze of juche and take as many with them as possible.


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Foreign Policy In Focus is a network for research, analysis and action that brings together more than 700 scholars, advocates and activists who strive to make the United States a more responsible global partner. It is a project of the Institute for Policy Studies (IPS) in Washington.

The Institute for Policy Studies is a community of public scholars and organizers linking peace, justice and the environment in the U.S. and globally. It works with social movements to promote democracy and challenge concentrated wealth, corporate and military power.


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Thursday, May 20, 2010

North Korea denies Involvement in the sinking of the Cheonan – Nothing Really New

A South Korean naval vessel Cheonan sank under mysterious circumstances on the night of March 26, 2010. A South Korean joint civilian-military investigation team (joined by a multinational team of experts) had been investigating the cause of the incident. The anticipation for the investigating team’s official announcement, with indications that a North Korean torpedo is the most likely culprit, had been building for a few weeks.

Throughout the investigation period, North Korea has vigorously denied it had anything to do with the sinking of the Cheonan. It’s first statement of denial was issued on April 17, 2010 (22 days after the actual incident), where North Korea accused South Korean “warmongers” of trying to link the sinking to Pyongyang to build an “international consensus” against it.

May 20, 2010, the South Korean joint civilian-military investigation team officially announced the results of its investigation to determine the cause of the sinking of the South Korean naval vessel Cheonan. The joint team concluded a North Korean midget submarine fired torpedo was to blame for the incident and made public torpedo debris salvaged near the site of the sinking.

In a surprising move, North Korean National Defense Commission (NDC) issued a strong protest against the South Korean findings while the results of the joint investigation were still being announced. The NDC stated it will dispatch its own inspection team to South Korea so that it can verify the “material evidence” that links the sinking to North Korea. The NDC also stated it will “promptly react to any ‘punishment’ and ‘retaliation’ and ‘sanctions’ infringing upon” North Korean “interests with various forms of tough measures including an all-out war.”

While the threat of “all-out war” seems to be harsh, such language is not unusual. In March 2008, North Korea threatened South Korea with destruction after Seoul’s top military officer said South Korea would consider attacking the North if it tried to carry out a nuclear attack – “Our military will not sit idle until warmongers launch a pre-emptive strike...everything will be in ashes, not just a sea of fire, if our advanced pre-emptive strike once begins.”

North Korea denying attacks on South Korea is nothing new.

On September 18, 1996, 26 North Korean commandos snuck into South Korean waters on the east coast in a submarine. Five days later, the North argued its submarine went adrift because its engine broke down. Under pressure from South Korea and the United States, the North's Foreign Ministry in December expressed its regrets.

Pyongyang was also in denial mode in November 1987, when two North Korean spies put a time bomb on a Korean Air passenger flight that exploded midair over the Andaman Sea, killing all 115 aboard. A week after the bombing, the North said it had nothing to do with it. In February 1988, Kim Il Sung called the accusation a "conspiracy" by the United States and South Korea.

The North's Rangoon bombing in Burma on October 9, 1983 targeted President Chun Doo Hwan but ended up killing three cabinet ministers and other officials. Three days later, North Korea denied any links and called the Burmese government's accusation of a North Korean assassination attempt "ludicrous."

On January 21, 1968, 31 North Korean armed commandos invaded northern Seoul with the mission to assassinate President Park Chung Hee. Twenty-eight of them were killed but not before they killed two South Korean police officers and five civilians. On January 24, the North hailed the infiltration as "the brave fight by South Korean armed commandos."

But more than four years later, North Korean leader Kim Il Sung apologized to South Korean intelligence chief Lee Hu-rak when Lee visited Pyongyang, and said some radical leftists in North Korea planned the mission.

Wednesday, May 19, 2010

Serial Number on torpedo propeller matches those used for the North Korean torpedoes - South Korea's Chosun Ilbo reports

Today's front page headline of the Chosun Ilbo (a conservative South Korean daily morning paper) read: Torpedo Serial Number Font Confirmed to be North Korean (어뢰 일련번호, 북한 글자체로 확인).

The report stated, according to a high ranking South Korean official, the joint civilian-military investigation team looking into the sinking of the South Korean naval vessel Cheonan has found "conclusive evidence proving" the North Korean torpedo was what caused the sinking of the Cheonan.

The report stated, the joint investigation team reportedly was able to retrieve a pair of torpedo propellers in relatively good shape last week in the mud near the location where the Cheonan went down. After comparing the serial number imprinted on the retrieved propellers to a known North Korean sample, the investigation team reportedly found the font and the imprinting style used in the serial number of the retrieved propeller to be a match to the North Korean sample.

The South Korean official told the Chosun Ilbo that given the torpedo debris recovered in the area, the presence of traces of RDX explosives on the hull of the Cheonan, and the latest discovery about the serial number, there is now conclusive evidence that the North Korea is behind the sinking of the Cheonan. The South Korean official also said the "foreign experts" agrees with the joint investigation team's analysis.

To read the entire Chosun Ilbo report in Korean, please Korean title provided above. If you would like to read the report in English, please read on for the translated version.


* There were some editorial liberties taken with the translation for style and grammar purposes, but not for content. Please let me know if there are parts of the translation that could be worded differently to better reflect the original Korean text.




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Torpedo Serial Number Font Confirmed to be North Korean

"The joint investigation team has found conclusive evidence (smoking gun) proving the Cheonan was sunk by a North Korean torpedo," a high-ranking official said on 18 May.

The joint investigation team has recently retrieved torpedo propellers (propulsion device) in relatively good shape. After analyzing the imprinted serial number, investigators discovered that the font and imprinting style match with that of a North Korean torpedo. The official said "after analyzing the serial number, foreign experts (of the joint investigation team) also agreed that the torpedo came from North Korea. Together with the finding of torpedo debris and traces of explosives, this is conclusive evidence", he added.

Another government official said "last weekend, a pair (2) of nearly intact torpedo propellers were found embedded in the mud."

"These propellers can be distinguished as such, even by non-experts," he added.

It was reported that the joint investigation team compared the recovered propellers with the North Korean light torpedo propeller that was obtained seven years ago and concluded that both samples share similar quality of material. Of note, a (North Korean) torpedo propulsion device is composed of two propellers rotating in opposite directions.

A computer simulation run by the joint investigation team has temporarily concluded that it is highly possible that a sound-guided torpedo with a 250kg warhead exploded around 3m underneath the gas turbine room of the Cheonan.

Analysis of the traces of explosives retrieved also revealed that they are similar to those recovered from the seven year-old sample.

Military authorities announced they found the diesel engine (of the Cheonan) which apparently fell apart during the explosion and it was transferred to Second Fleet Command in Pyongtaek, (South Korea), for gunpowder analysis. It was also reported that the (Cheonan’s) gas turbine was located and will soon be salvaged for further analysis.