Korea Institute for National Unification Researcher predicts North Korea's Third Nuclear Test in Reaction to Cheonan Situation

Following is an English translation of a piece written by Chon Song-hun, a Senior Fellow at the Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU).

This piece was printed in Korean and published on the KINU Online Series CO 10-19 in Korean.

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North Korea's Position on the Ship Cheonan Incident and Projected Future Attitude

[First part of the paper is about the official statements from South Korea and North Korea on the Cheonan incident, and those passages were not translated.]

North Korea's Projected Future Attitude

The North Korean authorities must have expected that the surprise attack by a small-sized midget submarine would remain a case of permanent unsolved mystery, if not a perfect crime. [They] must have expected that [the South Korean] Government would be at a loss due to its inability to find material evidence despite strong belief, and hoped that it would find itself in a tight dilemma due to criticism of security incapability from the conservative camp and criticism from the progressive camp calling for the withdrawal of the hostile policy toward the North.

Nevertheless, such an expectation proved futile with the announcement of the scientific, objective investigation results by an international joint investigation team. Instead, with the revelation that the sinking of Cheonan was a clear military provocation by North Korea, North Korea finds itself in a tight spot. Whenever a deception tactic to deceive a counterpart failed, North Korea used to choose a path that further deteriorated the circumstance. A case in point is that in the early 1990s when a false report to the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] turned out to be a fact, [the North] severed North-South dialogue and declared the withdrawal from the NPT [Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty]. In view of such an experience, this time, too, North Korea is likely to take an offensive reaction that damages stability on the Korean peninsula while using a strategy of offensive advancement to evade a defensive phase. Under the basic premise that the sinking of Cheonan has nothing to do with North Korea, North Korea will define the nature of all the measures it takes as a reaction in the self-defensive dimension against the international community's pressure on the North.

In the future, North Korea will attempt to incite mistrust and criticism for the [South Korean] government and create conflict among South Koreans by giving a political, economical, psychological blow by means of heightened tension through an offensive strategy toward the South. North Korean ships' infiltration of the NLL [Northern Limit Line] will continue and there is a likelihood that North-South maritime collisions may occur. As a counter offensive to South Korea's reaction, [the North] may fire surface-to-ship missiles against [the South] ships. Regarding the Kaesong Industrial Zone, [the North] would not easily close it in consideration of economic benefits and the domestic, international burdens in the aftermath of closing the zone. For the time being, [the North] will use the tactic of pressuring South Korea with the card of possible hostage-taking of the South side's workers. Nevertheless, in case the situation worsened, [we] cannot rule out the possibility that [the North] would take the measure of closing the zone.

Since strained North-South relations are inevitable for a considerable period, South Korea's internal strategy is likely to be adjusted. It appears that [the North] will promote the power-succession project, which will be concretized with the opening of the door to a powerful state in 2012, with the focus placed on the military aspect. [The North] will actually give up economic assistance from South Korea and try to find a breakthrough of economic losses from the military sector. In other words, it is likely that [the South] will create a semi-war situation with heightened confrontation against South Korea and achieve power succession amid the atmosphere of war. This is to overcome the people's discontent over the poor economy and the three-generation hereditary succession, by creating a threat of war.

In the international stage, including the United Nations, [the North] will unfold diplomatic warfare on the basis of two pillars of "North Korea's non-involvement" and "self-defensive reaction." A method that North Korean may choose to give a strong shock externally is a third nuclear test. It is expected that [the North] is highly likely to conduct a third nuclear test in a period between the conclusion of the eighth NPT evaluation meeting at the end of May and before the November US mid-term election this year.

In connection with this, [we] need to take note of the Rodong Sinmun report dated May 12 that North Korean scientists successfully conducted a nuclear fusion reaction. Nuclear fusion is a technology for manufacturing the H-bomb, which is mightier by tens or hundreds of times than the atomic bomb, whose principle is nuclear fission. [I] view that lurking behind the background of announcing North Korea's success in fusion technology is a calculation to conduct an additional nuclear test. It is expected that by carrying out a third nuclear test, which is much bigger in scale than the previous ones, [the North] will exaggerate its nuclear deterrent, implicitly showing off the fact that it has made a new nuclear warhead relying on the nuclear fusion technology.

The nuclear tests conducted in 2006 and 2009 were small-scale nuclear tests at the level of 1 kiloton and 2 kilotons, respectively. North Korea must have conducted small-scale nuclear tests with some calculation of its own, but with the West's reaction that North Korea's nuclear capabilities are nothing much, it is evaluated that [the North] plans an additional nuclear test that has much larger destructive power. In conclusion, the report of successful nuclear fusion may be a political move, and a prior ground-laying work, to conduct a third nuclear test by taking advantage of a tense atmosphere created by the Cheonan incident.

Kim Jong-Il: Right-Wing Mole?

An interesting piece published on Foreign Policy in Focus World Beat, Vol. 5, No. 20, 25 May 2010.

Kim Jong Il must work for the American Enterprise Institute. Or maybe it's the Heritage Foundation. The North Korean dictator doesn't talk much about his non-resident fellowship at a right-wing U.S. think tank. It might not go over well with the Politburo in Pyongyang.

But actions speak louder than words.

North Korea's sinking of the Cheonan, a South Korean ship that went down in March in the Yellow Sea near the maritime border between the two countries, is just what the right-wing doctors have ordered. Japan was looking a little squishy on the Okinawa base issue. China needed some reminders about just how rogue its erstwhile ally really is. And South Korea's conservative President Lee Myung Bak wanted confirmation that his containment approach to the north was justified.

Right on cue, Kim Jong Il torpedoed a South Korean ship, killing 46 sailors. The incident plays so much into the hands of North Korea's adversaries that some analysts have looked for other culprits, including friendly fire from either South Korea or the United States. While such speculation is interesting, it seems rather farfetched. In this age of WikiLeaks, it's hard to imagine a successful cover-up of such friendly fire. And the evidence implicating other actors is circumstantial, to say the least.

Meanwhile, Pyongyang's fingerprints are all over this one. The South Koreans have produced torpedo fragments from dredging the area where the ship sank. There's Korean lettering on the propulsion shaft that matches the font used in another North Korean torpedo the South Koreans have. And the South Koreans also matched traces of propellant to an earlier North Korean torpedo. Skeptics have challenged some of these findings, but the rebuttals in both news outlets and blogs are rather convincing.

Perhaps the South Korean government fabricated the evidence? Maybe. But South Korea was reluctant to point the finger at the north in the first place. A successful North Korean strike embarrasses the South Korean military and casts a shadow over the South Korean economy.

So, it looks as though AEI's overseas fellow is the most logical perp. As a result of his bold move, South Korea is suspending all contact with the North. Forget about trade (about a quarter of a billion dollars a year) and access to South Korean shipping lanes. Washington is backing its South Korean ally 100 percent. The hard right has been pushing for this kind of isolation policy against North Korea for some time.

Even more timely is the role the Cheonan sinking plays in U.S.-Japan relations. Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama was wavering on whether or not he should accede to U.S. pressure to build a new base in Okinawa to replace the aging Futenma Marine Corps facility. But, according to a senior U.S. official, the Cheonan incident reminded the Japanese government "that this is still a very dangerous neighborhood and that the U.S.-Japan alliance and the basing arrangements that are part of that are critical to Japan's security."

North Korea, in other words, has managed to torpedo all attempts to break the isolation of the country and reduce military tensions in the region. If the Dear Leader didn't receive under-the-table payments from John Bolton and friends, what on earth motivated such a self-destructive act? Perhaps Kim wanted to rally nationalist sentiment in the country on the eve of his son's succession to the top spot. Perhaps it was simple revenge for South Korea's firing on a North Korean ship that passed into South Korean waters last November. The maritime boundary between the two countries has been long disputed, so trespass is truly in the eyes of the beholder.

Actually, the situation is even more complicated, as Mike Chinoy points out in Forbes. When South Korean president Lee Myung Bak took office, he backtracked on his predecessor's pledge to work with North Korea to build confidence around the disputed maritime boundary. "The North was infuriated by what it saw as a deliberate belittling of accords signed by its all-powerful leader - what one western analyst described as 'sticking a finger in Kim Jong Il's eye,'" writes Chinoy. "So Pyongyang responded in a predictably belligerent fashion - by ratcheting up tensions in the disputed waters."

So, like with the Maine and the Tonkin Gulf incident, are we going to war? Fortunately, no one is calling for military retaliation against North Korea. South Koreans oppose military action by two to one, and they even support the maintenance of the south-managed Kaesong Industrial Complex, which employs 40,000 North Koreans (and would likely cost the south half a billion dollars to close). Even the Heritage Foundation is going only so far as to recommend an economic cutoff, further isolation of North Korea, and a clear condemnation in the Security Council. China remains lukewarm about any major challenge to North Korea and will do its best to throw a wet blanket over the controversy.

Washington will still try as hard as it can to pressure China into taking as hard-line a stance as possible. Other than express legitimate outrage, what would these stepped-up containment efforts achieve? About as much as Lee Myung Bak's initial hard-line posture. The North Korean government doesn't apologize when pushed up against the wall - it's content to fall back on its policy of self-reliance, or juche. And the North Korean people haven't risen up against their rulers when pushed into starvation. As Joel Wit points out in The New York Times, diplomacy remains our most viable strategy: "In the aftermath of the Cheonan sinking, the United States and South Korea must recognize that a return to dialogue would serve our interests. It is the only realistic way to rein in North Korea's objectionable activities."

This isn't a particularly palatable message right now in Seoul. And it probably won't go down very well here in Washington. But after a couple months of denunciations and attempted arm-twisting, it would be best if the countries involved in the Six Party talks take this advice to heart. If we want to prevent any future Cheonans, we need to sit down with North Korea. The last thing we want is a regime with nothing to lose - and plenty of weapons - to go out in a blaze of juche and take as many with them as possible.

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North Korea denies Involvement in the sinking of the Cheonan – Nothing Really New

A South Korean naval vessel Cheonan sank under mysterious circumstances on the night of March 26, 2010. A South Korean joint civilian-military investigation team (joined by a multinational team of experts) had been investigating the cause of the incident. The anticipation for the investigating team’s official announcement, with indications that a North Korean torpedo is the most likely culprit, had been building for a few weeks.

Throughout the investigation period, North Korea has vigorously denied it had anything to do with the sinking of the Cheonan. It’s first statement of denial was issued on April 17, 2010 (22 days after the actual incident), where North Korea accused South Korean “warmongers” of trying to link the sinking to Pyongyang to build an “international consensus” against it.

May 20, 2010, the South Korean joint civilian-military investigation team officially announced the results of its investigation to determine the cause of the sinking of the South Korean naval vessel Cheonan. The joint team concluded a North Korean midget submarine fired torpedo was to blame for the incident and made public torpedo debris salvaged near the site of the sinking.

In a surprising move, North Korean National Defense Commission (NDC) issued a strong protest against the South Korean findings while the results of the joint investigation were still being announced. The NDC stated it will dispatch its own inspection team to South Korea so that it can verify the “material evidence” that links the sinking to North Korea. The NDC also stated it will “promptly react to any ‘punishment’ and ‘retaliation’ and ‘sanctions’ infringing upon” North Korean “interests with various forms of tough measures including an all-out war.”

While the threat of “all-out war” seems to be harsh, such language is not unusual. In March 2008, North Korea threatened South Korea with destruction after Seoul’s top military officer said South Korea would consider attacking the North if it tried to carry out a nuclear attack – “Our military will not sit idle until warmongers launch a pre-emptive strike...everything will be in ashes, not just a sea of fire, if our advanced pre-emptive strike once begins.”

North Korea denying attacks on South Korea is nothing new.

On September 18, 1996, 26 North Korean commandos snuck into South Korean waters on the east coast in a submarine. Five days later, the North argued its submarine went adrift because its engine broke down. Under pressure from South Korea and the United States, the North's Foreign Ministry in December expressed its regrets.

Pyongyang was also in denial mode in November 1987, when two North Korean spies put a time bomb on a Korean Air passenger flight that exploded midair over the Andaman Sea, killing all 115 aboard. A week after the bombing, the North said it had nothing to do with it. In February 1988, Kim Il Sung called the accusation a "conspiracy" by the United States and South Korea.

The North's Rangoon bombing in Burma on October 9, 1983 targeted President Chun Doo Hwan but ended up killing three cabinet ministers and other officials. Three days later, North Korea denied any links and called the Burmese government's accusation of a North Korean assassination attempt "ludicrous."

On January 21, 1968, 31 North Korean armed commandos invaded northern Seoul with the mission to assassinate President Park Chung Hee. Twenty-eight of them were killed but not before they killed two South Korean police officers and five civilians. On January 24, the North hailed the infiltration as "the brave fight by South Korean armed commandos."

But more than four years later, North Korean leader Kim Il Sung apologized to South Korean intelligence chief Lee Hu-rak when Lee visited Pyongyang, and said some radical leftists in North Korea planned the mission.

Serial Number on torpedo propeller matches those used for the North Korean torpedoes - South Korea's Chosun Ilbo reports

Today's front page headline of the Chosun Ilbo (a conservative South Korean daily morning paper) read: Torpedo Serial Number Font Confirmed to be North Korean (어뢰 일련번호, 북한 글자체로 확인).

The report stated, according to a high ranking South Korean official, the joint civilian-military investigation team looking into the sinking of the South Korean naval vessel Cheonan has found "conclusive evidence proving" the North Korean torpedo was what caused the sinking of the Cheonan.

The report stated, the joint investigation team reportedly was able to retrieve a pair of torpedo propellers in relatively good shape last week in the mud near the location where the Cheonan went down. After comparing the serial number imprinted on the retrieved propellers to a known North Korean sample, the investigation team reportedly found the font and the imprinting style used in the serial number of the retrieved propeller to be a match to the North Korean sample.

The South Korean official told the Chosun Ilbo that given the torpedo debris recovered in the area, the presence of traces of RDX explosives on the hull of the Cheonan, and the latest discovery about the serial number, there is now conclusive evidence that the North Korea is behind the sinking of the Cheonan. The South Korean official also said the "foreign experts" agrees with the joint investigation team's analysis.

To read the entire Chosun Ilbo report in Korean, please Korean title provided above. If you would like to read the report in English, please read on for the translated version.

* There were some editorial liberties taken with the translation for style and grammar purposes, but not for content. Please let me know if there are parts of the translation that could be worded differently to better reflect the original Korean text.

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Torpedo Serial Number Font Confirmed to be North Korean

"The joint investigation team has found conclusive evidence (smoking gun) proving the Cheonan was sunk by a North Korean torpedo," a high-ranking official said on 18 May.

The joint investigation team has recently retrieved torpedo propellers (propulsion device) in relatively good shape. After analyzing the imprinted serial number, investigators discovered that the font and imprinting style match with that of a North Korean torpedo. The official said "after analyzing the serial number, foreign experts (of the joint investigation team) also agreed that the torpedo came from North Korea. Together with the finding of torpedo debris and traces of explosives, this is conclusive evidence", he added.

Another government official said "last weekend, a pair (2) of nearly intact torpedo propellers were found embedded in the mud."

"These propellers can be distinguished as such, even by non-experts," he added.

It was reported that the joint investigation team compared the recovered propellers with the North Korean light torpedo propeller that was obtained seven years ago and concluded that both samples share similar quality of material. Of note, a (North Korean) torpedo propulsion device is composed of two propellers rotating in opposite directions.

A computer simulation run by the joint investigation team has temporarily concluded that it is highly possible that a sound-guided torpedo with a 250kg warhead exploded around 3m underneath the gas turbine room of the Cheonan.

Analysis of the traces of explosives retrieved also revealed that they are similar to those recovered from the seven year-old sample.

Military authorities announced they found the diesel engine (of the Cheonan) which apparently fell apart during the explosion and it was transferred to Second Fleet Command in Pyongtaek, (South Korea), for gunpowder analysis. It was also reported that the (Cheonan’s) gas turbine was located and will soon be salvaged for further analysis.

O Kuk-ryol accompanies Kim Jong-il to view KPA livefire exercises

General O Kuk-ryol accompanied Kim Jong-il when Kim visited the Large Combined 567 Unit's live fire exercise (believed to be held on 14 April) that was conducted in commemoration of "the Day of the Sun." Gen. O, a vice chairman of the National Defense Commission. O has almost never accompanied Kim on these visits or "on the spot guidances" in the past despite the fact that he has been handling operations against the South for nearly three decades and enjoyed the trust of both Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il.

According to a report by the Korea Institute for National Unification, a South Korean government-funded think-tank, last November, O never accompanied Kim on such tours between 1994 and 2008. Last year, he only accompanied Kim to two cultural performances, and once laid a wreath at the Revolutionary Martyrs Cemetery in Mt. Taesong on April 25, on the 77th anniversary of the Army.

O worked as the director of the North Korean Workers' Party's Operations Department, an agency in charge of espionage operations against the South, from 1989 to 2009.

Last year, the North reportedly integrated party and military espionage agencies such as the party's Operations Department, an office known as "Office 35," and the military Reconnaissance Bureau, into a single department led by Kim Yong-chol and placed under O's supervision.

There is a theory purported by South Korean media and by some government circles that O may be behind the sinking of the ROKS Cheonan, and his appearance with Kim Jon-il was meant as a reward for successful mission accomplishment; however, we believe this is a highly unlikely and the South Korean speculations are just that - speculations - with no evidence to support them.

We believe that O accompanying Kim Jong-il was more for internal North Korean consumption as Kim Jong-il attempts to bolster his control and power over the military and the party. This tendency also showed in Kim's latest promotion of 100 generals, where the North Korean National Security Agency won out in the number of generals being promoted.

Other party and military leaders accompanying Kim Jong-il to watch the exercise included Kim Yong-chun, the minister of the People's Armed Forces; Ri Yong-mu, another vice chairman of the Defense Commission; and Ri Yong-ho, the chief of the Army's General Staff.

Kim Jong-il watches KPA livefire exercise

Japan decides to extend Sanctions on North Korea by another Year

The current Japanese sanctions on North Korea that was implemented in October 2006, which includes a ban on North Korean vessels from making port calls in Japan, is set to expire next Tuesday. Today, the Japanese government decided to extend the sanctions against North Korea for another year. This makes it the sixth extension of the October 2006 sanctions.

North Korea's failure to fulfill its promise to reinvestigate abduction cases of Japanese nationals, and the North's failure to return to the Six-Party Talks were noted as the reasons for the extension of sanctions.

N. Korea Threatened Currency Violators with Death Penalty (Kyodo World Service)

Tokyo - North Korea banned the use of foreign currencies after the government revalued the won last December, threatening to impose the death penalty on violators, a Japanese journalist who specializes in North Korean affairs said Monday.

Jiro Ishimaru, founder and editor of Rimjin-gang, a magazine featuring reports and photographs by North Koreans living in the country, released a photo showing a North Korean government announcement on the ban dated Dec. 28.

The photo, taken in early January on the outskirts of Pyongyang by a contributor to the magazine, shows the notice was issued by the Ministry of People's Security on Dec. 28.

The notice announces a ban on the circulation of all foreign currencies as of Jan. 1 and urges members of the public who witness the illegal use of foreign currencies ''to immediately report to legal authorities.'' Ishimaru said the notice was apparently posted throughout the country but he believes the measure was relaxed by mid-February.

North Korea revalued the won last December and imposed restrictions on the quantity of old bills that could be converted into new ones. Under the revaluation, 1 new won is equivalent to 100 old won.

Yonhap News Agency says Nails of Kim Jong-il Abnormally White…'Proof of Kidney Malfunction'

On 9 March 2010, South Korea's semiofficial news agency Yonhap carried on its website (in Korean) an article analyzing the color change of Kim Jong-il's hands and nails based on photos of him taken before and after April 2009. The article also claimed that the color change is an indication that Kim Jong-il is suffering from serious kidney malfunctions which require dialysis.

Yonhap claims that since April 2009, Kim Jong-il's nails have started to look "opaque and white," unlike the color of a healthy person's nails. To support this claim, it compared Kim Jong-il's photo (photo No 1) of his inspection of a Korean People's Army unit in August 2008 against photos (photo No 2-8) taken after April 2009.

Yonhap claims that his nails were relatively "clear and flesh-tonned" in the photos of his military inspection in August 2008 (as can be seen in photo No 1) and those taken in November 2008 after he recovered from a stroke. However, his nails looked opaque and white in the photo at the SPA rostrum in April 2009 (photo No 2). The report claims that this was also observed in his photos taken during his inspection of an Air Force unit in May 2009 (photo No 3), talks with former US President Clinton in August 2009 (photo No 4), his visit to Kim Il Sung University in December 2009 (photo No 5), and the meeting with Wang Jiarui in February 2010 (photo No 8).

Yonhap cited South Korean kidney doctors' opinions on the color change. They said that "if you develop uremia due to kidney malfunctions, your skin gets easily tanned, and you are highly likely to develop anemia." They pointed out that this appears to be why "the back of Chairman Kim's hand is unusually dark, while the nails are white." Some of them claimed that if Kim Jong-il has been given a dialysis, chances are high for Kim Jong-il to be given a peritoneal dialysis, rather than a hemodialysis, since the former gives less stress on the heart and can be carried out while patients are sleeping or on the move.

The report cited comments from aa South Korean Government official who refused to confirm the abnormality with regard to the color change of Kim's hands and nails and also the rumor of Kim's suffering from kidney malfunctions, by saying that "all we can say is that given Chairman Kim Jong-il's health status, he currently has no difficulty in ruling North Korea."

Comparison of Law on Rason Economic Trade Zone Before and After Revision

Yonhap News Agency originally ran this on March 14 on its Korean website.

Click on the images below for a larger view of the comparison table.

North Korean Linux-based OS

North Korea has its own "Internet" – a national information network independent from the US-based Internet regulator – it apparently also has its own operating system (OS), named Red Star, reportedly developed by order of Kim Jong-il.

A Russian student Mikhail, who studies at the Kim Il-Sung University and writes a blog [written in Russian] from the Russian embassy in Pyongyang, has recently purchased the Red Star OS and tested it. RT.com, with permission from Mikhail, provided some photos and screen shots of the OS and provided an opportunity to take a glimpse at IT life of North Korea.

Curtis Melvin has very kindly posted the article on his blog North Korean Economy Watch. Here's the link: http://www.nkeconwatch.com/2010/03/01/dprks-linux-os-red-star/

Same tune and not so different verse

The Korean People’s Army (KPA) General Staff issued North Korea’s first response to the annual ROK-US combined exercise, Key Resolve, on February 25 via North Korea’s Korean Central News Agency (in English) and Korean Central Broadcasting Station (in Korean). The overall tone of this year’s initial denouncement of the ROK-US combined exercise is consistent with those of the past years. Additionally, mentioning of the need for “nuclear deterrent” was also found to be consistent with past years’ statements.

KPA General Staff Denounces Key Resolve 2010:

• Ignoring our repeated warnings, the enemies finally announced that they would stage the Key Resolve and Foal Eagle joing military exercises, which are northward aggression war exercises, from 8 March. (KPA General Staff carried on Korean Central Broadcasting Station [KCBS], 25 February 2010)

• The enemies describe [the joint military exercises] as annual exercises and defense, but [the exercises] are pilot operations and nuclear war exercises aimed at a surprise, preemptive attack on our Republic to all intents and purposes. (KPA General Staff carried on KCBS, 25 February 2010)

• If the US imperialists and South Korean puppet warmongers carry out the aggressive joint military exercises despite our repeated warnings, we will respond to them with our powerful military counteraction, and if necessary, we will mercilessly beat to a muddy place the stronghold of aggression by mobilizing all the offensive and defensive means, including nuclear deterrent. (KPA General Staff carried on KCBS, 25 February 2010)

ROK-US Combined Military Exercises are “an act of provocation and northward aggression”:

• Currently, the US imperialists have drafted an adventurous plan of preemptive nuclear attack of northward aggression and war scenarios according to various circumstances, such as "Operations Plan 5027-04" and "Operations 5030. … These exercises are no different, even a bit, from the existing joint military exercises aiming at northward aggression in terms of scale and aggressive character, although the titles have been changed… (Rodong Sinmun , 13 March 2008)

• The staging of the "Key Resolve" and "Foal Eagle" joint military exercises, as an extremely adventurous and extremely dangerous provocation by those who are dreaming of provoking a nuclear war, is a serious military threat to, and a de facto declaration of war on, our Republic. We can never tolerate the war provocation maneuvers that the belligerent group of Lee Myung-bak is committing for northward aggression in conspiracy with the outside forces. (Rodong Sinmun, 11 March 2009)

• The enemies describe [the joint military exercises] as annual exercises and defense, but [the exercises] are pilot operations and nuclear war exercises aimed at a surprise, preemptive attack on our Republic to all intents and purposes. (KPA General Staff carried on KCBS, 25 February 2010)

Nuclear deterrent needed to defend against “the US and the ROK Aggression”:

• The United States plans to hold reception, staging, onward movement and integration (rsoi) exercises and foal eagle maneuvers with south Korea from March 22. … They are still rendering the situation around the Korean peninsula extremely strained, while intensifying the moves to isolate and stifle the DPRK. The Korean people, who consider independence to be their life and soul, are keeping a close eye on the U.S. moves, while further strengthening the self-defense nuclear deterrent to cope with them. (Korean Central News Agency [KCNA], 14 March 2004)

• At a time when the situation on the Korean peninsula is rushing toward a phase of explosion because of the US hostile policy against the DPRK, on 14 [March], aircraft carrier Kitty Hawk crawled into Pusan Port and a number of naval vessels, including cruisers and destroyers, crawled into South Korean ports. These [naval vessels] are reported to participate in the upcoming RSOI and Foal Eagle joint military exercise that will be staged starting from 19 [March]. … The persistent and adventurous US policy to crush the DPRK compel us to head toward strengthening the nuclear deterrent forces. (Rodong Sinmun, 17 March 2005)

• Intentionally straining the situation on the Korean peninsula with the excuse of the nuclear issue, the United States has carried out one war exercise after another, such as the "Foal Eagle" and the "Ulchi Focus Lens." … While ceaselessly upgrading war exercises, the United States is frantically preparing a war of aggression. Our army and people have achieved single-hearted unity, which is stronger than a nuclear weapon, under the great military-first leadership of the respected and beloved General Kim Jong-il and consolidated the self-defensive nuclear deterrent that can overwhelm the United States' "policy of strength." (Uriminjokkkiri, 25 June 2006)

• In the midst of this confrontation madness, the Lee Myung-bak gang began the first "task" of the regime by playing up to the US warmongers and launching the aggressive "Key Resolve" and "Foal Eagle" joint military exercises, which target their fellow countrymen. … The resolution and will of our army and people, who seek to rescue the fate of the nation and protect the foundation of [our] lives through the nuclear deterrent of justice, are fully charged. Besides South Korean society, those inside the gang are also quite troubled with unease and fear over the risk of the new war that the Lee Myung-bak gang is bringing along now. (Rodong Sinmun, 09 April 2008)

• Our Republic has enough ability and modern military and technological means capable of weakening their "military and technological edge." We trust our own military strength and are proud and confident about them as a matter of fact. An international lesson of the 21st century and our Republic's historic experience say that when [we] have powerful self-defensive national defense capability at our disposal, [we] do not fear any international cordon sanitaire by the united imperialist force or any kind of war. The US warmongers' frantic commotion of nuclear war exercises is pushing us toward reinforcing [our] war deterrent even further. (Rodong Sinmun, 10 March 2009)

• If the US imperialists and South Korean puppet warmongers carry out the aggressive joint military exercises despite our repeated warnings, we will respond to them with our powerful military counteraction, and if necessary, we will mercilessly beat to a muddy place the stronghold of aggression by mobilizing all the offensive and defensive means, including nuclear deterrent. (KPA General Staff carried on KCBS, 25 February 2010)

Continued “US and ROK Aggression” will be met with “Merciless Counterattack”:

• Dialogue and confrontation, and peace and war can never go together. If the enemies dare to ignite a war without discretion, the DPRK will give decisive punishment to the aggressors with merciless counterattack. (KCNA, 05 March 2008)

• There is no limit to the retaliatory measure of the KPA and no one can predict or evade it. If the warmongers dare launch a war of aggression defying our repeated warnings, our revolutionary armed forces will counter it with resolute and merciless just war for reunification. (KCNA, 08 March 2009)

• If the US imperialists and South Korean puppet warmongers carry out the aggressive joint military exercises despite our repeated warnings, we will respond to them with our powerful military counteraction, and if necessary, we will mercilessly beat to a muddy place the stronghold of aggression by mobilizing all the offensive and defensive means, including nuclear deterrent. (KPA General Staff carried on KCBS, 25 February 2010)

The North Korean media has reported on, and denounced, all major ROK-US combined military exercises since the mid-70’s and this year has not been an exception. On February 25, the KPA General Staff issued its denouncement of the planned Key Resolve ROK-US combined military exercise (additional denouncements have followed since). The overall tone of this year’s denouncement has been consistent with those of the past years - “an act of provocation and northward aggression.”

This year’s KPA General Staff statement also said, “…we will mercilessly beat to a muddy place the stronghold of aggression by mobilizing all the offensive and defensive means, including nuclear deterrent.” Use of the term “nuclear deterrent” and the context the term was used in this year’s statement were also found to be consistent with past North Korean denouncements of the ROK-US combined military exercises.

North Korea, as usual, threatens South Korea and the US over combined exercise

North Korean People's Army General Staff spokesman issued a statement today threatening to attack South Korea and US forces for a scheduled combined military exercise in March.

The enemies describe [the joint military exercises] as annual exercises and defense, but [the exercises] are pilot operations and nuclear war exercises aimed at a surprise, preemptive attack on our Republic to all intents and purposes.

If the US imperialists and South Korean warmongers launch the joint military exercises for aggression, ignoring our repeated warnings, we will react to them with our powerful military counteraction, and if necessary, mercilessly destroy the bulwark of aggression by mobilizing all the offensive and defensive means including nuclear deterrent.

North Korea routinely claims the annual South Korea-US exercise that mobilizes tens of thousands of US and South Korean troops and equipment amounts to a precursor to an invasion of its soil.

Here are the two versions of the February 25 North Korean statement issued in response to the exercise (one is a KCNA version that was released in English and the other is a translation of the KCBS broadcast that was originally broadcast in Korean):

KPA General Staff Spokesman Blasts Projected U.S.-S. Korea Joint Military Exercises (KCNA, 25 Feb 2010)

The U.S. imperialists and the warmongers of the South Korean puppet army finally announced that they would stage the DPRK-targeted Key Resolve and Foal Eagle joint military exercises from March 8.

In this regard a spokesman for the General Staff of the Korean People's Army released the following statement Thursday: Massively involved in the exercises will be more than 18 000-strong forces including over 10 000 U.S. imperialist aggression troops present in south Korea and ultra-modern military hardware as well as army corps-level, fleet command-level and flying corps-level units of the South Korean puppet army and even civilian forces. The enemies describe the exercises as "annual ones" and "defensive" but they are pilot operations and nuclear war exercises aimed to preempt a surprise attack on the DPRK, to all intents and purposes.

From the outset of the year the warmongers of the South Korean puppet army in collusion with the U.S. imperialists have frantically staged mid-winter tactical exercise, large-scale coordinated ground exercise and other exercises of various codenames, while talking about a "preemptive attack" over self-defensive nuclear deterrent of the DPRK. This is by no means accidental.

This brought to light their true colors as war fanatics keen to bring dark clouds of a nuclear war to hang over the inviolable land, while seeking escalated tensions and confrontation only.

We will not remain a passive onlooker to this grave situation created by the provokers.

If the U.S. imperialists and South Korean warmongers launch the joint military exercises for aggression, ignoring our repeated warnings, we will react to them with our powerful military counteraction, and if necessary, mercilessly destroy the bulwark of aggression by mobilizing all the offensive and defensive means including nuclear deterrent.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

Press statement by a spokesperson for the General Staff of the Korean People's Army [KPA] (Korean Central Broadcasting Station in Korean, 25 Feb 2010)

Currently, a touch-and-go dangerous situation, in which a war may break out any moment, is being created on the Korean peninsula due to brigandish US imperialists and South Korean puppet warmongers' reckless war maneuver.

Ignoring our repeated warnings, the enemies finally announced that they would stage the Key Resolve and Foal Eagle joint military exercises, which are northward aggression war exercises, from 8 March.

Massive forces of some 18,000-strong forces, including over 10,000 troops of the US aggression forces forcibly occupying South Korea, and state-of-the-art arms and equipment are to be intensively committed to the joint military exercises. [Also,] army corps-level, fleet command-level, and flying corps-level units of the South Korean puppets and even civilian forces are to be mobilized.

The enemies describe [the joint military exercises] as annual exercises and defense, but [the exercises] are pilot operations and nuclear war exercises aimed at a surprise, preemptive attack on our Republic to all intents and purposes.

It is by no means coincidental that South Korean puppet warmongers, who colluded with the US imperialists, have been frantically staging training under all kinds of pretexts, including mid-winter tactical training, and large-scale joint ground training, from the beginning of the year, while recklessly saying that they will launch a preemptive attack by picking on our self-defensive nuclear deterrent.

This by itself revealed that the US imperialists and South Korean puppet warmongers are the ones who are war fanatics trying to bring in dark clouds of a nuclear war to our sacred land, while only pursuing aggravation of tension and confrontation.

We will not just keep looking at today's grave situation created by the provokers.

Each heart of our military and people, who hold a deep grudge that has built up for more than half a century due to the aggressors, is strongly seething with soaring hatred and rage against the enemies that are igniting fire to a fuse of war, while giving off the smell of gunpowder, on this land today.

If the US imperialists and South Korean puppet warmongers carry out the aggressive joint military exercises despite our repeated warnings, we will respond to them with our powerful military counteraction [kangnyo'khan kunsajo'k taeu'ng]; and if necessary, we will mercilessly beat to a muddy place the stronghold of aggression [ch'imnyagu'i aso'ngu'l mujabihage chukt'angch'yo'bo'rilgo'sida] by mobilizing all the offensive and defensive means, including nuclear deterrent.

[Dated] 25 February 2010, Chuch'e 99, Pyongyang.

Joint Statement by the North Korean Ministry of People's Security and Ministry of State Security

The North Korean Ministry of People's Security and Ministry of State Security issued a joint statement yesterday (February 08, 2010) entitled: "Will Mercilessly Squash Anti-Republic Fanatics Who Attempt to Harm Our Highly Dignified System and the Country's Security" while the inter-Korean talks were being held in Kaesong, North Korea, to discuss the resumption of the Mount Kumgang and City of Kaesong tours - a foreign currency cash cow for Kim Jong-il.

The statement claimed North Korea has a secret strike force to counter what it called "South Korean plots" to topple its regime.

The statement also criticized efforts by the South's military to defend the disputed Yellow Sea (West Sea) border - the Northern Limit Line - and "reckless" operations to destabilize the North.

It said, without elaborating, "We have world-level ultra-modern striking force and means for protecting security which have neither yet been mentioned nor opened to the public in total."

The North Korean state media released the statement both in Korean and in English. The Korean version was released on air via Korean Central Broadcasting Station, and the English version was released via Korean Central News Agency.

The timing and the contents of the statement suggests externally it was a tactical negotiation package that was designed to provide North Korea maneuver room in inter-Korean and international negotiations. Internally, as with numerous other statements of this kind, it was designed to assure the people the regime has everything under control and justify the regime's military and nuclear policies by pointing out the necessity of these policies due to threats posed to the North from those pesky South Korean sycophants and the American imperialists.

hmm....new statement....same old theme....

As we mentioned above, there were two versions of the statement - one in Korean released on the Korean Central Broadcasting Station, and one in English released on the Korean Central News Agency. We have uploaded both versions (to include the original Korean text) and we also compared the two versions to identify any differences.

Click here for the Korean text of statement (KCBS).
Click here for the English translation of the statement (KCBS).
Click here for the KCNA version of the statement released in English.
Click here for the comparison of two versions.

Cellular Technology, the Internet, and North Korea

Obtaining current or recent information from within North Korea is an enormous challenge for the US and its allies in the region. Cellular technology and the Internet, however, have brought about new opportunities to gain access to the reclusive North.

The report about North Korea’s devaluation of its currency was first reported by a Seoul-based Internet news service called the Daily NK on November 30, 2009. This report, which made headlines around the world and was later confirmed by the South Korean government officials, had far-reaching implications. The Daily NK is one of six news outlets that have emerged in recent years specializing in collecting information from North Korea. All of these outlets have North Korean defectors as their employees and all reportedly cultivate sources inside North Korea, a country with near-total media blackout.

The information provided in the reports of these “cottage-industry” outlets are sketchy at best. They cover small pockets of the North Korean society, largely remain unconfirmed, and many are proven wrong. However, they have also produced important tips and clues - such as the currency devaluation and a recent outbreak of H1N1 flu in North Korea. Today, the traditional media outlets of South Korea regularly quote these atypical news services.

Click here for the full report.

Interviews with a former member of Kim Jong-il's "pleasure squad" Part 1 of 4

The North Korea Leadership Watch recently posted a piece titled KJI Behind Closed Doors. In the posting, there is a mention of a series of interviews with a former member of Kim Jong-il's "pleasure squad" posted on a Korean language blog called Nambuk Story. We thought it was worth a while for us to translate the interview and share the translated version with everyone.

Of all the parts of the interviews, we thought parts 5 and 6 were most interesting. So, we started our translation with parts 5 and 6. We do plan on translating the entire interview in sequence, so stayed tuned.

Here are interview parts 5 and 6:

Part 5 – Kim Jong-il’s Luxurious Underground Villa:

Joo: According to a book written by former KJI’s private chef Fujimoto Kenji, at the Sinchon Guest House, KJI once made five pleasure brigade soldiers get naked and forced them to dance with other officials. Is that possible?

Mi Hyang: KJI was very conscious of the way other officials look at him.

If he did, it would be unprecedented. But I can’t say it is impossible, because when he got drunk, he turned… hmm… somewhat perverted.

When he was drunk, he was not aware of his behavior.

I did not observe it personally, but I’ve heard that on one occasion one of his aids advised him to stop drinking (when he drank excessively), and KJI yelled “put him in jail!”

Next morning, KJI woke up and he looked for his aid. When he was told that he was put behind the bars, KJI replied “did I say that yesterday?” and he called him in again.

When he drinks, he gets drunk just like any regular person. But he always behaved in our presence… although I remember he cried once.

He never cried buckets. But he had us sing sad songs and dropped tears.

Joo: Have you read the book “KJI’s Chef” written by Mr. Fujimoto?

Mi Hyang: I know who he is, but never read his book.

When we met KJI, no one else was with us. Of course… there were a couple of aids who would lead us to him, but I never saw a chef. The food was delivered by other people. Sometimes it was delivered by an elevator.

It is true that KJI loves sushi. We ate a lot of sushi too for that reason. Maybe he (Fujimoto) made it.

I enjoyed every dish, but sushi was the best. Since I arrived in South Korea, I visited many Japanese restaurants looking for the same quality, but I am yet to taste something similar. (Because she had not read the book, we gave her a copy in late October. After reading first few pages, she read about KJI’s one week menu, and she commented as the following)

I see a lot of shark dishes (in this menu). We definitely had a lot of shark. When we first met, we had an Italian food and it came with a shark dish.

Sushi was often served on unique plates.

I have seen a sushi plate placed on a fishbowl with goldfishes swimming in it. It gave a very unusual feeling.

KJI once recommended to me something and asked if I knew what it was. When I answered I did not know, he said it was that “stuff” (genitalia) of a shark.

When I heard that, I almost vomited.

When we came back home, I asked my friend Mi-ok “why do they eat something like that, when there are many other fine food?” She answered that “stuff” was excellent for male stamina and female skin conditioning.

The book mentioned a bowl of “white rice only.” But I don’t recall eating white rice only. He always had a bowl of 5 – 6 different kinds of grain.

It was then that I first learned that it was possible to cook rice with pine nut and walnut. Well… actually when they served steak, it came with a small amount of white rice.

When we first met, KJI asked me what my favorite food was.

So I answered “I would never get sick of eating naengmyon (cold noodles).” He sounded nostalgic, and he said “My father used to enjoy naengmyon a lot… but I don’t quite like it.”

Joo: Did you meet KJI in Pyongyang only?

Mi Hyang: No. We actually traveled a lot. We visited his private villas and hunting areas.

There were so many villas I do not remember every name. When I was a student, I was not told the names, but my friend Mi-ok said, “by the time you graduate from the Central Party, you will know everything.”

If I had known I would be coming to South Korea in a few years, I would have memorized every detail. But at that moment I was not curious or cared to remember. I guess I was too young and naive. During our lessons, we were told not to ask questions.

When KJI traveled, we usually traveled a day (or at least hours) ahead and placed on stand by.

I do not want to talk about the villas right now, because it would take too long. I think KJI would hate to have people talk about his special villas.

Joo: Then please tell us about one memorable detail about his villa.

Mi Hyang: I remember we once traveled 40 minutes in car underground to get to a villa. Everything was underground.

That is why it is so memorable to me. I guess I should not call it a villa (because it is underground). The underground road had one traffic lane. It was not too narrow or too wide.

Mi-ok said, “This is a very special place to the General. Only the General and we can come to this place.”

The place an electronic game room, swimming pool, bedroom, dining room, etc. It was very luxurious.

I don’t know what South Koreans would think of it; however, to North’s standard it is extremely luxurious.

The underground villa was especially fancy. A day prior to KJI’s arrival, we used to swim in the swimming pool. Its width was narrow, but its length was about 50m.

One noticeable aspect of the swimming pool was the big portrait of KJI drawn at the bottom. The center of the portrait was decorated with golden tiles. I thought it had probably cost a lot of money. The bedroom was very impressive too.

Joo: Are there many underground villas?

Mi Hyang: Without a doubt. I would call it a “hiding place” rather than a villa. There are a lot of these places in Pyongyang.

These facilities are under civilian buildings such as People’s Great Library and Kwangbok Shopping Mall. Soundproofing is so amazing people can’t even imagine these places exist.

These hiding places have a separate exit. During the Gulf War, I saw Husain’s palaces getting bombed, but I don’t think that tactic will work in North Korea.

These are civilian buildings and damaging these underground places is not easy. Also, there are too many of these places and they are all interconnected.

Joo: Does the Body Guard Command control the roads connecting these underground facilities?

Mi Hyang: Yes. There is a special unit guarding the roads. Soldiers of this unit receive many benefits.

According to North Korean military regulations, a soldier must be at least 30 years old before he can get married. However, officers of this unit (once they reach certain age) were authorized to spend a night with a woman.

These women were usually those who were assigned to Section 5 just like me, but did not make it to the final selection process. So their physical appearance was quite remarkable. These women were separately given a different education and stayed at hotels.

I think they served to foreign VIPs. Those who were on stand by (because there was no guest), were available for soldiers.

Joo: Do other people carry any weapon when they travel to hunting areas with KJI?

Mi Hyang: When we traveled with him, nobody accompanied us. Only KJI carries a gun. Even Mi-ok was not given a gun. We practiced shooting too, but we never had a chance to shoot in front of KJI.

Body guards were very far. They usually stood 50 ~ 100m away.

KJI is a fine shooter. After the hunting was over, the pheasants caught during day was the menu for dinner. It was very delicious.

When we first went hunting together, KJI gave me a new name. He said my name was countrified and started calling me Mi-hyang.

Mi stands for beauty and Hyang stands for scent.

Since then (until I defected from NK) my name has been Mi-hyang. We had a special ID issued by the Central Party, and my name there was Mi-hyang as well.

§ The vernacular for part 5 of the interview can be located online here at Nambuk Story.

====================

Part 6 – Actress Han Ji-min, Kim Jong-il’s Ideal Type:

Joo: I just noticed every name (Mi-ok, Mi-hyang, Mi-so, Young-mi) had the word “Mi” in it.

Mi Hyang: Yes. I believe the word Mi means his woman. Mi-so had a very pretty smile. I think that is why she was given that name. Young-mi changed her name to Mi-ae later on.

KJI had a tendency to repeat himself when he was drunk.

What it was funny was the fact that he would forget the names gave us himself.

After a couple of drinks, he used to point with his finger and constantly repeat questions such as “are you Mi-ok or Mi-hyang?”

Also, his explanation of our names changed every instance. He once said, “You know what Mi-ok means, don’t you? It means the one with beautiful skin like jade.” But after a few drinks he said, “Mi-ok stands for the one with beautiful voice like jade marble.”

Joo: Was Mi-ok’s job only to educate you?

Mi Hyang: Mi-ok was KJI’s lover and slept with him, but she was his secretary at the same time. Her conversation with KJI was very friendly and natural, but never disrespectful.

She was born in Pyongyang. She had her own luxurious house, a present from KJI, inside the Central Party building complex. But the reason she slept in 5th Section’s building was to facilitate a smoother transition period for me and to teach me more about KJI. Of course… another reason was that she was my partner.

She used to step out a lot. Sometimes she drank and came back late at dawn or in the afternoon. Sometimes she drove herself home in the Mercedes that KJI gave her.

Joo: You must have many memories of Mi-ok.

Mi Hyang: Public press must be interested in Mi-ok because she was KJI’s lover.

Mi-ok and I were roommates for two years so I have heard many things from her. But I don’t want to reveal more, because I am worried about her.

Mi-ok thought I would be her successor. But she was never jealous of me and treated me as if I was her blood sister. I was lonely in there, but she was lonely as well.

She used to hold me tightly and tell me that I would follow her steps. She also said, “you and I will live a lonely life.” Her voice was sad when she spoke those words. She was a nice person.

According to what we had learn at school, I was supposed to call her “comrade Mi-ok” but when we were alone in our room, she had me call her “sister.” She often talked about her brother who she missed a lot.

In her closet, she kept many gifts from KJI. When I described them as being very pretty, she replied, “I would like to give them to you, but I can’t because they were given by the general.”

She also said, “This is nothing compared to what I have at home. When you start serving to the General, you will be given a big house and all kinds of gifts.”

Joo: What do you think her destiny will be?

Mi Hyang: We are discharged from the military when we are 26 or 27 years old. At the time of discharge, we are junior Lt or Captain. But those who had “that kind of relationship with KJI” had to stay alone (single).

Of course we received the best treatments. After the discharge, we had the option of staying next to KJI working as his secretary.

Mi-ok conducted many miscellaneous duties for KJI, so I am sure she stayed with KJI. Her love and loyalty towards KJI was deep.

Those who were not involved in a close relationship with KJI were married with Bodyguard Command’s officers to protect the secret.

KJI displayed a basic sense of morality. He would touch my head and hold my hands, but he never called me for intimate moments because I was still a student and not over 20 years-old. I think he would have done so, if I stayed a little longer.

Joo: I am sure you have heard of Kim Ok. Is Mi-ok by any chance Kim Ok?

Mi Hyang: I do not know the name Kim Ok. I first saw her picture, when I came to South Korea. I had never seen her picture in North Korea. She looked very cute and vivacious in the pictures.

Among our group of 10 students there were people that looked like her. But as far as physical appearance, Mi-ok was far more beautiful.

And I heard the news that Kim Ok spoke to KJI casually. But the news is hard to believe because KJI likes her woman to be obedient.

The press also spoke the possibility of Kim Ok being an influential figure in politics, but that is hard to believe too. KJI is not the kind of person that shares power with a woman. Plus, I don’t think he would let the situation get to that point either.

Mi-ok was a bit ambitious and jealous and KJI did not like those qualities.

However, not everything was about physical appearances. I once saw Mi-ok treat a woman over 30 years-old with utmost respect. When I asked her who she was, Mi-ok replied, “she is the General’s secretary and gets a lot of respect from the General.” To my point of view, she was not beautiful.

Joo: How is his taste in women?

Mi Hyang: It’s hard to say. I guess I will just tell you what I felt.

First, he thinks the eyes are the most important factor. And he pays attention to the balance between the eyes and hair. He liked me because I had dark black eyes that matched with my black hair.

His philosophy of beauty is that the color of eyes and hair must match.

Then he looks at the mouth. It does not matter how pretty a girl is if she has thin lips.

The nose must be sharp.

He was very detailed. He held my hands and when he saw my fingers he said, “you must be sensitive because you have long fingers.”

He did not like heavy make-up. I once wore artificial eyelashes and he hated it. I never wore them again.

He was kind enough to teach us how to use perfume. Mi-so had once used too much perfume, so he told her to spray it in the air and bring the body into the mist.

All the cosmetic products we used were from France, such as Chanel. We were never given high heels of 5 cm or more.

That was probably because of his height. He did not like it when a woman was taller than him. His favorite female outfit was skirts with pleats. So we wore lots of that design.

We could spend nights just talking about this topic.

Joo: Suppose South Korean actresses were born in North Korea. In your opinion, who would the best chance to be picked by KJI?

Mi Hyang: Well… it’s hard to say because the standard of beauty is different in South and North.

In South, the face is not that important because one can always “manufacture” it. However, the body and height are important factors to South Koreans. It does not matter how pretty you are, if you are not tall - you will never win the Miss Korea Beauty Contest.

That is why it is hard to find any actress that did not have plastic surgery.

To be picked by KJI, you must be a natural beauty. Any history of plastic surgery or correction would serve as a negative. The height should be appropriate.

If I had to choose one without considering is she had plastic surgery or not, hmm… (she spent a long time to think) the first one that comes to my mind is the leading actress from Korean drama “Isan”. She had the role of Song-yon. She is small and pretty.

*I looked for her name after the interview and it was Han Ji-min.

I have heard the news that Lee Young-ae is KJI’s favorite style of woman. I don’t know who made that story up, but I don’t think that is correct.

There are many rumors of some North Korean actress being KJI’s lover.

I don’t know how it was in the 70s, but I don’t think that has been the case since the 5th Section was established.

Members of the 5th Section are selected among the most beautiful women in the country. So why would he take chances of dating someone risking to become a public rumor? That does not make sense to me.

§ The vernacular for part 6 of the interview can be located online here at Nambuk Story.

Koryolink commercial

We came across this interesting video clip of North Korean commercial on Koryolink, North Korea's 3G cellular network that was launched as a joint venture between the Egyptian telecommunications giant Orascom and the North Korean central government in December 2008, today. North Korean Economy Watch has written about Koryolink a while ago, but thought the commercial was interesting to share.

A short note on Strategic vs Tactical North Korean Rhetoric

With recent increase in North Korean rhetoric and today's North Korean live fire exercise that rattled the nerves of the South Korean military and increased tensions between the two countries, we thought it might be worth a while to discuss very quickly the differences of the North Korean rhetoric that is designed for strategic and for tactical purposes.

North Korea uses varying levels of rhetoric depending on its objectives. Overall, rhetoric issued by higher levels of governmental body tend to be strategic whereas lower level government body pronouncements tend to be tactical.

• Strategic Rhetoric: Tends to address larger issues, often framed as the regime's initiative in order to achieve diplomatic and political progress. It is typically designed to hint and provide justification for the regime's foreign policy priorities. Contrast to the tactical rhetoric, strategic rhetoric is almost always carried by domestically oriented media outlets.

• Tactical Rhetoric: Tends to be more inflammatory, often framed as responses to events external to the country. They have been used in the past to strengthen the regime's negotiating position ahead of bilateral or multilateral negotiations. Tactical rhetoric is also typically carried by the externally oriented media outlets, and they are designed to give the regime with maneuver room to either turn-up or -down the rhetoric as situations dictate.

Greater Tumen Area Economic Development Project: A Background

Many in Northeast Asia wish to see the Tumen Basin develop into a place for economic cooperation and competition. One such plan is the Greater Tumen Initiative (GTI), formerly known as Tumen River Area Development Project (TRADP), being carried out under the auspices of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The 20-year 80 billion USD plan calls for the creation of port facilities and transportation infrastructure in the region to support a multinational trading hub. Countries participating in the GTI are China, Mongolia, North Korea, Russia and South Korea.

The goal of GTI is to make the area into a free economic zone for trade to prosper and attract investment into the area. For China, the project would give traders in Northeast China easier access to major international ports without having to circumnavigate the Korean Peninsula and thus stimulating growth in China’s northeast rustbelt. For Russia, the project would give the ability to better exploit resources in Siberia and allow easier access to North Korea’s resource-rich hinterland; the area just to the south of the Tumen contains reserves of oil, minerals, coal, timber, and abundant farmland.

Development of the Tumen River area and North Korea’s participation in this project means inflow of hard foreign currency, improvements in infrastructure, and possible increase in industrial capacity. North Korea, with its bleak economy, therefore, will most likely continue to support the development of Tumen River area and increase its future involvement in the project as it seeks to break the economic isolation and hardship it has suffered since the collapse of most of its communist allies and the implementation of international sanctions.

Click here for a copy of full product.

Photos Indicate Demotion of North General?

A close aid of Kim Jong-il has dropped a rank, from four-star to three-star general, in a recently released photo that shows Kim Jong-il inspecting a joint training of ground, naval and air forces.

General Kim Myong-guk, 70, a high-ranking official in charge of military operations under the North's general political bureau of the Ministry of the People's Armed Forces, appears as a colonel general in the pictures released by Korean Central Television in Pyongyang, which showed Kim Jong-il observing the joint drills along with three generals, including General Kim, on Monday. In the photos, General Kim is explaining the training operations to Kim Jong-il. Reporting on military operations is the responsibility of a colonel general.

South Korean government sources said Kim seems to be retaining his position at the ministry. The colonel general was promoted to general in 1994, and the Rodong Sinmun, the official newspaper for the North's ruling Workers' Party, had called him a four-star general until last September.

But General Kim might have been demoted since then.

"Kim Myong-guk has remained a general for a long time. And since he accompanied Kim Jong-il recently for the joint drill inspection, Monday's photo was not an old one taken before he was promoted to four-star general," a high-ranking South Korean government official said to the South Korean JoongAng Ilbo on condition of anonymity. "We have intelligence that he has been demoted, but we are still trying to verify that, and if it's true to determine the cause of the demotion."

Another official told JoongAng Ilbo, "Even though there are some cases in North Korea where generals have been removed from their positions due to political or professional negligence, it is unprecedented to see an officer remaining a general while being demoted."

Political science professor Choi Jong-kun at Yonsei University said there is no recent incident other than the inter-Korean naval clash near Daecheong Island on the Yellow Sea Nov. 10 that would account for a demotion. Pyongyang reinforced the intensity of its training in areas around the Yellow Sea after the battle and declared waters around Northern Limit Line "a peacetime naval firing zone."

"I believe North Korea demoted Kim Myong-guk as a penalty for losing the naval skirmish," Choi said.

Other sources said they believed the punishment was the result of abuse of authority by General Kim. They also said General Kim likely retained a general's title because he is a core aide of Kim Jong-il.

General Kim accompanied the North's leader to inspections 15 times last year.