Regional Update for September 10

Japan-China: The captain of a Chinese fishing boat was taken to a Japanese court on Ishigaki Island in Okinawa Prefecture on 10 September. Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi demanded the "immediate and unconditional" release of the captain and other crewmembers, according to news relays.


Yang summoned Japanese Ambassador to China Uichiro Niwa to lodge a third protest with Tokyo over what the Chinese Foreign Ministry described as an "illegal detention." Yang told Niwa that Beijing is determined to defend Chinese sovereignty of the Diaoyu Islands, where the ramming incident occurred, and demanded the unconditional release of the boat and crew, according to the ministry

Japan asserts the incident occurred in Japanese territorial waters and that Japan is handling the case in line with domestic law, Niwa told the Chinese. On 10 September a Japanese court ruled that prosecutors can detain the captain of the Chinese fishing boat for 10 days.

In reaction to and protest of the court ruling, the Chinese announced a postponement of a second round of negotiation over disputed island territories. Lest the Japanese miss the point, the Chinese statement described the postponement as a "grave protest."

Comments from KGS NightWatch: Japan and South Korea require little encouragement in standing up to China on territorial or other disputes. In part, this is because they see China's export dependent modern sector as a competitor with their own export-driven economies. Neither Japan nor South Korea is inclined to accommodate China or accept it as a regional leader.


An epochal strategic shift continues to evolve in which Asian States are not only taking responsibility for the security of Asia, they are shaping the nature of the strategic relationships. Japan and South Korea will not roll over for China the way North Korea is doing,with or without US assistance.

South Korea-US: A US Defense Department spokesman announced today, 10 September, that the aircraft carrier USS George Washington will participate with South Korea in war games in international waters of the Yellow Sea off the Korean Peninsula. The US spokesman said the deployment is not aimed at challenging China, but is a warning to North Korea.

Comments from KGS NightWatch: After much hemming and hawing, the US appears to have made a decision in favor of strategic dominance and in favor of US Allies in Asia. Apparently thanks for the extra time to think straight goes to the intervention of a typhoon. The typhoon delayed Allied anti-submarine warfare training in the Yellow Sea and gave the US leadership time to make a decision in favor of American allies and interests.

China-Taiwan: Taiwan's Coast Guard Administration (CGA) will conduct a maritime rescue drill the week of 13 September with China's Maritime Search and Rescue Center, Taiwanese Central News Agency reported 10 September. The drill will be held in waters off southeastern China, between Taiwan's Kinmen Island and Xiamen, China.

Taiwan's CGA will send nine patrol boats, including a 500-ton patrol vessel, and helicopters to Kinmen. All participating ships and rescue teams will carry flags that symbolize the joint drill, CGA officials said, in an attempt to avoid territorial disputes.

Comments from KGS NightWatch: The drill will be the first time the two coastal patrol agencies will have held joint exercises.

Burma (Myanmar)-China: The China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) has begun construction of China-Myanmar oil and natural gas pipelines, according to Chinese media. The announcement coincided with a ground-breaking ceremony for a 200,000 barrel-per-day oil refinery in Anning city, Yunnan Province, China.

According to the CNPC statement, the company wants to complete the China section of the pipelines, as well as the refinery, by 2013. The oil pipeline, which will have a capacity of 440,000 barrels per day, will wind 771 kilometers (479 miles) through Myanmar, then stretch 1,631 kilometers though China before ending in Chongqing.

The natural gas pipeline will have a 12 billion cubic meter capacity, and will span 793 kilometers in Myanmar and 1,727 kilometers in China before ending in Guangxi region. The company did not disclose whether or when all three projects would receive final approval from China's National Development and Reform Commission, the body in charge of economic planning and pricing.

Comments from KGS NightWatch: The significance of this information plus other recent reports about China building a railroad through Burma is that they reinforce the assessment that Chinese leaders see Burma as a gateway for channeling natural resources to China.


This symbolizes the next step in China's economic imperialism by creating a network of vertical and horizontal monopolies on a global scale that gather and ship back to China the resources from concessions in Third World countries that the Chinese already have secured.


By using Chinese-made Burmese ports and infrastructure, natural resources from Africa and the Middle East can reach hubs in southern China and avoid the hazards of transiting the Straits of Malacca and Singapore and the South China Sea.

Regional Update for September 7

China-Burma (Myanmar): China hailed Myanmar as a "friendly neighbor" and warned the world not to meddle in its upcoming election. General Than Shwe, the head of Burma's military junta, arrived in Beijing for a state visit with President Hu Jintao. Than Shwe's visit will last four days during which he will meet all the top officials.


Comments by KGS NightWatch: Today's praise plus warning expose the fundamental difference between the Chinese communist ideas of democracy and those of the West, even taking into account the imperfect nature of Western voting practices. The fact of a vote is important in authoritarian Asian states; they approve of the legitimacy that voting lends authoritarian rule. The idea the outcome might be determined by the electorate, however, is alien to this political philosophy.


Thus the Chinese could with a straight face endorse the already ham-fistedly contrived Burmese elections - what do Burmese generals know about democracy?


In a strategic sense, the Burmese leaders are engaged in a dangerous policing balancing act to retain some freedom of action between India and China. Than Shwe's visit indicates the Burmese junta prefers to tilt towards China more than India.

China-India: Yesterday, 6 September Indian Prime Minister Singh told New Delhi newspaper editors that, ""China would like to have a foothold in South Asia, and we have to reflect on this reality." India had to be aware of this, and also of a "new assertiveness among the Chinese - and it was difficult to tell which way it will go."

Today, 7 September, in an effort to downplay Prime Minister Singh's remarks, the Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Jiang Yu said China is committed to safeguarding peace and stability in Asia, including South Asia. Jiang said China is one of the important members of Asia, and that seeking common development with it, South Asia and other countries is in the common interest of "all of us."

Comments from KGS NightWatch: Several features of the exchange are worth noting. First the Indians are aware of and are monitoring Chinese inroads in the Indian Ocean region, which they claim as their sphere of influence. Second, the Indians describe this as new assertiveness, a term not yet recognized in Western commentaries. Third, the Chinese attempt to assuage Indian concerns is actually a deliberate challenge in which China claims interests in al South Asia, as well as East Asia.

China-Iran: China's Railways Minister Liu Zhijun will visit Tehran on 12 September to sign a contract between Iran and a Chinese company to build a $2 billion rail link to Iran, according to Iranian Transport Minister Hamid Behbahani. Transport ministers from Tajikistan, Afghanistan and Iran are expected to gather in Dushanbe in October to firm up the deal for a 2,000-kilometer (1,200-mile) route that links China and Iran.

Comments for KGS NightWatch: For more than a decade Chinese leaders have talked about linking Chinese rails with systems in Central Asia at meetings of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Within the past five years, the Chinese have backed their talk with investment.


China has railroad projects in Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Burma and now Iran. It has road and pipeline projects in Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan.


Many of the projects are scheduled to be completed by 2012. Their cumulative effect would be to shift the economic focus of Central Asian states from Moscow to Beijing. The advantage China brings is that the Chinese rails would use standard gauge, making it possible to ship from the Pacific Coast of China to Turkey without changing bogeys or moving containers in order to accommodate different rail gauges.


Until the Chinese projects become operational, all rail traffic from Asia to Europe will continue to rely on Russian gauge railroads and multiple gauge changes in Asia and at the border of European states.

Afghanistan: NATO and Afghan forces hope to clear the Taliban out of Kandahar by the end of November, according to a statement by the commander of international forces in the south of Afghanistan. NATO forces have secured Kandahar city and are now targeting the surrounding districts of Arghandab, Zharai and Panjwai. British Major General Nick Carter said that 15,000 to 17,000 Afghan security forces and 15,000 international troops have numerical superiority over an estimated 1,000 Taliban insurgents in and around the city.

Comments by KGS NightWatch: The only significance of this report it that it is the first open source estimate of the number of Taliban in Kandahar. The force ratio of 30 allied troops for each Taliban continues to favor the Taliban.

From Our Friends at KSG NightWatch: For the Night of 29 August

* Contents below are entirely from our friends at KSG NightWatch:

North Korea-China: North Korean Leader Kim Jong-il remained in northeast China on 29 August visiting the city of Harbin. Initial news reports asserted Kim's train was bound for Pyongyang. Instead, The train left Changchun, the capital of Jilin Province, which borders North Korea, the evening of the 28th and went south to Harbin to visit a plant.

The Japanese media reported hotel closures and tightened security at the Dandong border crossing site, the usual signs that North Korean leadership train's arrival is expected.

Comment: The proximity of this visit to the Party general meeting in early September is the basis for the inference that Kim's visit is related to the process of introducing his third son to the Chinese leadership and showing him around and off.

The visit appears too short to have moved other outstanding issues, including flood relief along the Yalu and the Six Party Talks. The brevity and location of the visit to Chinese areas near North Korea support those analyses that the visit also served the strategic goal of quieting the international environment before and during the Party plenum.

One commentary assessed that also was the primary aim in the North's handling in such low key fashion former President Carter's visit to obtain the release of the captive American. Aside from Six Party talks, there are now no potentially disruptive issues between the US and North Korea, such as an American in a North Korean jail.

The trip to China during the Carter visit also conveys a clear statement of North Korean foreign policy priorities. China is more important than the US.

These assessments imply that for the next two weeks, tension should ease and provocations are unlikely. However, the North may be expected to respond in prickly fashion to any actions by the US or South Korea that it perceives as a provocation, just to show that its inward focus does not signify weakness or inability to respond swiftly. China will be in overwatch position. The message from North Korea is, "leave us alone." - KGS NightWatch

Comment from the Author: Xinhua News Agency's English site posted a report on the Chinese president Hu Jintao's meeting with Kim Jong-il on Friday, 27 August, at 7:19 PM on 30 August, Beijing Time - which would make it 7:19AM on 30 August, Eastern Time.

China-Burma (Myanmar): Xinhua News Agency (the official news agency for the PRC) reported two Chinese navy ships from the 5th Escort Task Group, the Caohu and Guanhzhou, called at Myanmar's Thilawa Port on 29 August. The visit is to last five days to promote "good" relations.

Comment: This is the first time Chinese naval ships have called at a port in Burma. It also is a direct challenge to Indian naval dominance of the Indian Ocean region. - KGS NightWatch

A report on nuclear connection between Myanmar (Burma) and North Korea

very interesting article that appeared in the Bangkok Post on 02 August 2009 about Myanmar's (Burma) nuclear weapons program and its connections to North Korea.

The article was written by Professor Desmond Ball and Phil Thornton.

Professor Desmond Ball works at the Australian National University's Defence Studies Centre. He is the author of more than 40 books on nuclear strategy, Australian defence, and security in the Asia-Pacific. He has served as the co-chair of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific.

Phil Thornton is the author of Restless Souls: rebels, refugee, medics misfits on the Thai Burma border.

Here's the article:

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Burma's nuclear bomb alive and ticking (Bangkok Post (Perspective Supplement), 02 Aug 09 p 10-13)

By Desmond Ball and Phil Thornton

Talk to regional security authorities or their embassy staff about Burma having a nuclear programme and it usually generates two responses - total disbelief or horror. Strategic defence studies expert Professor Desmond Ball and journalist Phil Thornton spent two years investigating rumours, speculation, misinformation and the small truths that all help to conceal the Burmese military regime's nuclear ambitions from serious examination

Our own starting position was one of deep skepticism, but the testimonies from two defectors forced us to consider the uncomfortable possibilities of a Burma with nuclear capability. In June 2007, we began separate interviews with two Burmese defectors in what would become the first in a series of clandestine meetings in dingy rooms and safe-houses that would continue until early July 2009. We first interviewed Moe Jo*, a Burmese army defector, on the Thai-Burma border. Moe Jo had recently crossed the border into Thailand and was still in the initial stage of fright brought on by his flight from the army and loss of community support. His hands shook and he worried about what price his family would have to pay for his actions.

Before rejecting his country's nuclear plans Moe Jo was an officer with 10 years of exemplary army service and a former graduate of Burma's prestigious Defence Services Academy.

In 2003 Moe Jo was selected by the regime to spend two years studying at Moscow's Engineering Physics Institute in the Faculty of Experimental and Theoretical Physics. He says he was sent to Moscow to study engineering and did not know he would end up in the nuclear project. He was in the second batch of 75 trainees sent to Russia as part of Burma's nuclear programme to train 1,000.

We also held a series of interviews in 2008 with a civilian, Tin Min*, who before defecting, worked as a bookkeeper for Tay Za, a business tycoon and close associate of senior Burmese army generals, including General Than Swe. Tay Za's company, Htoo Trading Company, organised the nuclear contracts with Russia and North Korea. Tin Min spoke excellent English and presented his reports to us with a touch of self-importance. Tin Min had good reason to know what it was like to feel important. Before defecting, he had scaled the heights of his country's high-society and had reaped the benefits of that position. Tin Min insisted Burma's rationale for having a nuclear programme was nonsense.

"They [regime] say it's to produce medical isotopes for health purposes in hospitals. How many hospitals in Burma have nuclear science? Burma can barely get electricity up and running. It's a nonsense."

Considering the World Health Organisation ranks Burma's health system as the second worst out of 192 countries and the regime spends more than 40% of its budget on the military and less than 3% on health and education, it is unlikely Burma is developing and investing in a nuclear reactor for health reasons.

NUCLEAR REACTIONS

What the defectors told us, and access to transcripts of Burmese Army communications, helped us straighten out much of the confusion and speculation on the public record. It has been widely reported that a nuclear reactor has been built at eight or nine different sites in Burma.

The defectors' detailed and adamant testimonies, coupled with the radio transcripts, contradict this - they say Burma has no more than two reactors, one located at Myaing and the other at Naung Laing.

But not everyone in the region agrees about the extent or the purpose of the Naung Laing operation. A senior regional security officer with extensive up-to-date inside information about the area disagrees.

"Before it was a heavily guarded 'no-go zone'. Now you can drive right up to the buildings. Villagers are allowed to grow crops again. Even though the signs say; 'Military Science and Technology Ministry' and there are soldiers, the level of security has been drastically reduced. I think it's now a decoy site, to distract people away from the Myaing area."

The Myaing reactor is located in Magwe division and is known as the "Nyaungone Project". It is part of the MOU signed with Russia's atomic energy agency Rosatom (the Russian Federal Atomic Energy Agency) in May 2007 to build a 10-megawatt light-water reactor using 20 % enriched Uranium-235, nuclear waste treatment and burial facilities, an activation analysis laboratory, medical isotope production laboratory and to train 300 specialists for the nuclear centre.

At the time, a US State Department deputy spokesman, Tom Casey, was reported as saying that the US "wouldn't like to see a project like this move forward" until Burma has an adequate nuclear regulatory and security infrastructure in place.

The second "secret" or military reactor site that the defectors provided a large amount of detailed information about is built inside the smallest of three mountains by North Koreans at Naung Laing. Both the defectors agreed the underground mountain facilities house another 10-megawatt light-water research reactor.

Cooperation between North Korea and the Burmese regime on nuclear matters began in earnest in September 2000 when a MOU was signed by Burma's Lieutenant General Thein Hla and North Korea's Major General Kim Chan Su. Four more detailed contracts were signed in 2001-02.

The "official" agreements between the two countries covered nuclear related activities at two sites and involved North Korea's assistance to help with installing, maintaining, training and supplying equipment at the uranium refining and enrichment plant at Thabike Kyin. At the second reactor site at Naung Laing the North Koreans agreed to help with the construction of an underground facility and a nuclear reactor. Tin Min's old boss Tay Za paid a construction company in 2004-05 to build a tunnel wide enough for two 10-wheel trucks to pass each other. Moe Jo said the regime had taken steps to defend their reactors by installing air defence radar, one to be "deployed" at the airbase at Pyin Oo Lwin and the other at the reactor site.

In recent months as North Korea struts its nuclear capacity it has forged closer ties with the Burmese regime by selling arms and missile technology to them.

The defectors told us that the Burmese army has been building since 2002 a nuclear research and engineering centre in the vicinity of Naung Laing village, south east of Pyin Oo Lwin in Mandalay Division. Pyin Oo Lwin is also home to the Defence Services Academy, Moe Jo's old alumni. Moe Jo said he was told that after he returned from Moscow he would be assigned to a special nuclear battalion at one of the nuclear sites in Burma.

''After I came back from Russia I was assigned to develop a system to fire 155 howitzers. But first I had to do three months training, run by [North] Korean technicians, on using artillery missile systems.''

BURMA'S URANIUM DEPOSITS

Uranium mining takes place at at least 10 locations in Burma. Burma's Ministry of Energy has identified five areas with confirmed deposits of low-grade uranium. Ore samples have reportedly been sent to Russia and Iran for evaluation. At Taundwingyi, next to one of the uranium sites identified by the Ministry of Energy, the North Koreans have built a large underground bunker. In addition to these sites, high resolution imagery published by Google Earth in 2007 shows what many believe is a uranium mine and related refinery at Myit Nge Chaung, about 23km from Mandalay.

In April 2009, it was reported that reactor-grade uranium for Burma's nuclear programme was being mined near Lashio in northern Shan State.

According to radio transcripts, Russian uranium prospectors made three exploration missions to Tennasserim Division in southern Burma in 2004-05. The Russian explorers' movements were tracked as they flew from Rangoon on July 8, 2004, to Myeik and their subsequent prospecting around the area of Theindaw from July 18 to October 5, 2004.

REFINING AND PROCESSING PLANTS

Burma has at least two uranium refining and processing plants in operation for crushing, grinding, cleaning and milling (refining) the uranium ore into ''yellowcake'' (U308), a concentrate of uranium oxides in powder form. Yellow cake is later converted to uranium hexafluoride (UF6) for enrichment to provide fuel for reactors or fissle material for nuclear weapons. Tin Min claims that businessman Tay Za told him the regime has nuclear dreams, and they are serious.

''They're aware they cannot compete with Thailand with conventional weapons. They [the regime] want to play nuclear poker like North Korea. They hope to combine the nuclear and air defence missiles. Tay Za told me the nuclear programme is known as the 'UF6 Project' and is the responsibility of General Maung Aye.''

Both processing plants are close to the Irrawaddy River, one is seven kilometres from the river and is near the Tha Pa Na Military Science and Technology Development Center and the other plant is near the Thabike Kyin township.

Being close to the river allows the regime to use barges to transport the heavy ore rather than rely on the inadequate roads.

Tin Min says as Tay Za controls much of the shipping in and out of Burma it is easy for him to organise getting the equipment to the nuclear sites from Rangoon.

''He arranges for army trucks to pick up the containers of equipment from the North Korean boats that arrive in Rangoon and transport them at night by highway to the river or direct to the sites.''

Moe Jo estimated that there were more than five North Koreans working at the Thabike Kyin plant. He said Russian cleaning machines were used to ''wash'' the ore and that Burma has provided yellowcake to both North Korea and Iran.

Google Earth imagery published in 2007 shows a facility with what looks like four giant ''thickening tanks'' in which the uranium bearing solution is separated from the ground ore before being converted to yellowcake.

HAS BURMA THE CAPACITY TO PRODUCE A NUCLEAR WEAPON?

The essence of Moe Jo and Tin Win's testimonies is that Burma has key parts of the nuclear fuel cycle already in place. Moe Jo told us that the army ''planned'' to build a plutonium reprocessing plant at Naung Laing, and that Russian experts were already ''teaching plutonium reprocessing'' at the site.

A ''nuclear battalion'' was established by the regime in 2000 to work on the ''weaponisation'' aspects of the nuclear programme. It is based near the village of Taungdaw, just west of the Naung Laing complex. The operations component is in another underground complex in the nearby Setkhya Mountains. It includes engineering, artillery and communications on operational aspects of weapons design, delivery capability and a command and control centre.

Moe Jo says by 2012, Burma will have 1,000 people trained, access to uranium, is refining yellowcake and has two light water reactors.

''You don't need 1,000 people in the fuel cycle or to run a nuclear reactor. It's obvious there is much more going on.''

These reactors are not as efficient in producing fissionable plutonium as heavy-water reactors, but as North Korea has shown with their reactor, it may be slow and more complex, but it is capable. For Burma to be able to extract plutonium from the spent fuel rods and to separate plutonium-239 from plutonium-240 it needs to construct a plutonium reprocessing plant so it can produce seven to eight kilograms of weapon-grade Plutonium-239 a year, enough for one bomb a year.

In the event that the testimonies of the defectors are proved, the alleged ''secret'' reactor could be capable of being operational and producing one bomb a year, every year, after 2014.

A Burmese nuclear weapons programme would require external support, going beyond rudimentary Russian training and North Korean assistance with the current uranium refining capabilities and reactor operations. But North Korea taking on a greater role in helping Burma get its bomb cannot be rule out. They would be more than interested in providing limited amounts of fissionable plutonium in return for yellowcake.

It would be in North Korea's military interest, and in line with their nuclear posturing, to construct a secret plutonium reprocessing plant in Burma, complementing the secret reactor, in exchange for access to the fissionable product. The defectors talked explicitly of the regime meeting their nuclear programme objectives by having a ''handful of bombs ready by 2020''.

According to all the milestones identified by the defectors, Burma's nuclear programme is on schedule.

It is feasible and achievable. Unfortunately, it is not as bizarre or ridiculous as many people would like to think. Burma's regional neighbours need to watch carefully, especially for signs of a reprocessing plant. If the regime starts building that then the only explanation is that they plan to build a bomb.

A Burma with nuclear capability is a worry, if the regime's response to last year's Cyclone Nargis is a benchmark.

Their response was to treat it as a national security threat, by banning journalists, ignoring offers of outside help for weeks, while leaving their people to die in their thousands. The region cannot expect any more from the regime if there is any sort of nuclear accident.

Time for a close look at Burma's nuclear programme

There is good reason why regional intelligence sources are skeptical of the Burmese military regime's nuclear capacity. Verifying stories coming out of Burma is hard. The regime has banned the international media. Defectors may inflate their own importance in the hope of getting themselves resettled to a third country and exiled Burmese political activists need to keep the international spotlight on the regime's negative activities.

It is not unknown for the regime to also put out misinformation to cover what it is really doing. Burma is a poor country, infrastructure in rural areas is virtually non-existent and sanctions against the regime have restricted their earning potential.

In recent years the US government has voiced concerns over North Korean, Syrian and Iranian plans to build weapons of mass destruction, but so far has kept silent about Burma. Australian defence analyst Andrew Selth, a research fellow at Griffith Asia Institute, is reported as saying there is always a lot of smoke surrounding Burma's nuclear ambitions.

"Over the past year or so, the amount of smoke has increased, but still no one seems to know whether or not it hides a real fire. With this in mind, strategic analysts in many countries are looking to the Obama administration for an authoritative statement on Burma's nuclear status."

In May 2007, in a press release announcing the deal to build a nuclear-research reactor in Burma, Russia's atomic energy agency, Rosatom, said it would be under the control of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Burma is already a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, established under the responsibility of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and it is required to allow inspections of its nuclear facilities, but so far has failed to do so.

Skeptical regional security agents and embassy insiders are willing to concede that the Burmese regime cannot be trusted. And for good reason. Burma lies near the top of the world's worst lists; child soldiers, landmines, forced labor, forced displacement, suppression of political opponents, disease control, illicit narcotics, trafficking people and corruption.

A recent number of high profile interventions by the international community involving both Burma and North Korea have added to the distrust. Early last month the North Korean freighter the Nam Kam 1 was shadowed by US warships (sanctioned by the UN) as it headed to Burma with an unknown cargo, believed to be arms.

On July 1, the global edition of the New York Times reported that Japanese police arrested a North Korean and two Japanese nationals for allegedly trying to export illegally to Burma a magnetic measuring device that could be used to develop missiles.

Burma does have a nuclear programme, but what is uncertain is the extent of it, and until it can be convincingly denied that there is no possibility the regime is developing nuclear weapons, regional security authorities are maintaining their silence, but privately say Burma's nuclear plans need closer scrutiny - and the sooner the better.

* Names of defectors used in the article are not their real names

Myanmar's ambitious plan of missile defense system...with help from North Korea...of course

Various reporting on suspected (and some proven) connections between Myanmar (Burma) and North Korea has gotten more attention in public than in previous years. Of course, anything with words North Korea and proliferation anywhere near each other on the same page, especially if they are accompanied with words like missile, ballistic, or nuclear, are news items of interest these days. Here is an interesting article about Myanmar's ambition to develop a missile defense system and how they have been cooperating with North Korea from The Irrawaddy, a news magazine published by the Irrawaddy Publishing Group (IPG).

Just in case you are not familiar with this news magazine, the IPG was founded in 1992 by Burmese exiles living in Thailand, and it has been closely associated with the pro-democracy movement. Nonetheless, it remains unaffiliated wit any of the Burmese political groups (pro-democracy or otherwise). The Irrawaddy is published in both English and Burmese with a primary focus on Myanmar (Burma) although other Southeast Asian countries are also covered to a lesser extent. It is regarded as one of the foremost journalistic publications dealing with political, social, economic and cultural developments in Myanmar (Burma). It is also frequently cited by international media outlets as a source of reliable information.

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Now the article:

Burma's Missile Dream (The Irrawaddy, 01 Aug 09 - 31 Aug 09 Issue)

By Aung Zaw

Naypyidaw appears to be intent on setting up a missile defense system to deter potential enemies

Is Snr-Gen Than Shwe delusional? Subordinates of Burma's paramount leader are said to have repeatedly heard him say how much he admires North Korea's use of missile technology to bully and defy its neighbors and the West. The bad news is that Than Shwe's hard-line military leaders and ministers may agree with him.

However, Burmese opposition groups in exile suspect that army officers who disagree with Than Shwe's policy deliberately leaked secret documents to exiled media groups, including The Irrawaddy. These documents throw light on Burma's military ties with Pyongyang.

One leaked document detailed Gen Shwe Mann's secret visit to Pyongyang in November 2008. Accompanying Burma's No 3 general was Air Defense Chief Gen Myint Hlaing.

The 37-page secret report included photos of visits to a missile factory and anti-aircraft units, suggesting what was on the military's shopping list. The documents gave details of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed between the two armed forces. The MoU indicated that North Korea would build some Burmese military facilities, including tunnels for missiles, aircraft and even naval ships. Burma would receive training for its special forces and air defense units, and a language exchange program between the two armed forces would begin.

The secret report mentioned a visit to a missile factory outside Pyongyang, where Shwe Mann studied the production of Scud-D, E and F missiles, but it is difficult to confirm whether Burma would buy long-range missiles. Analysts believe that Burma has purchased medium-range missiles with a range of 500 to 1,000 kilometers. The secret report recommends that Burma begin producing its own ballistic missiles.

Technology Transfer

In February 2006, Eric John, the then US deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, expressed Washington's concern at what appeared to be the imminent re-establishment of diplomatic relations between Burma and North Korea. Calling the two countries "outposts of tyranny," the Bush administration accused them of isolating themselves to the point of being driven into each other's arms.

John said there were grave concerns about the potential transfer of military technology to Burma from North Korea; these concerns appear to have been well-founded.

In June this year, police in Japan arrested the presidents of three Japanese companies on suspicion of violating the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Law. They were accused of attempting to export a 7 million yen (US $73,000) magnetic measuring device that could be used to develop long-range ballistic missile systems, the Japanese newspaper Yomiuri Shimbun reported.

According to the report, the Toko Boeki trading firm had tried in September 2008 and in January 2009 to export the device to Burma's Ministry of Industry 2, which plays a key supporting role in Burma's nuclear program because it is headed by the chairman of the Myanmar Atomic Energy Committee. Both attempts were halted when the Japan's Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry notified the company that they had failed to request an export license.

Police initially believed that the device was bound for North Korea via Malaysia and Burma, until they studied the contents of the order and materials seized when they raided the Toko Boeki company in February. They suspected that the firm had exported other missile development-related equipment to Burma, leading them to believe that North Korea was trying to transfer missile technologies, such as its Taepodong system, to Burma.

The export attempts were based on an order by the Beijing office of the Hong Kong-based New East International Trading Ltd in early 2008. The firm is believed to be under the direct control of the Second Economic Committee of the Pyongyang's Workers' Party of Korea. The committee is responsible for the party's military procurements.

Arms Build-up

Though Burma is poor and its population suffers from almost daily power blackouts, the revenue from selling the country's gas reserves to its neighbors is allowing the military regime to expand its arms purchases.

Over the past decade, Burma has been buying missiles from North Korea, China and Russia, and both Burmese and foreign defense analysts suggest that Burma has bought short and medium-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs).

Jane's Defense Weekly reported that since 2001 Burma has obtained low altitude surface-to-air missile systems from Bulgaria, SRBM air defense systems from Russia and countries in eastern Europe, and is thought to have purchased surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs) from Ukraine, as well as multiple rocket launchers from China.

Defense analyst Maung Aung Myoe wrote in his 2009 book, "Building the Tatmadaw," that Burma had appeared to acquire some 36D6 radar from Ukraine in late 2002. It is designed to detect air targets at low, medium and high altitudes, and to perform friend-or-foe identification.

Maung Aung Myoe also wrote that as early as 2003, Burma was in secret talks with North Korea to buy Hwasong (Scud-type) missiles.

The Burmese leaders became more serious about buying missiles and missile technology after a series of border skirmishes with Thai forces in 2001-2002. At the height of the tension, Thailand reportedly employed Suppression of Enemy Defense Systems (SEADS), before sending its sophisticated F-16 jet fighters into border air-space. Sources in the Tatmadaw admitted that communication lines between front-line troops and command centers were severely disrupted.

The Burmese leaders reportedly do not trust their eastern neighbor, and well-informed sources inside the Tatmadaw said that Burma worries about a proxy war, possibly backed by a marine invasion by a foreign power. Burma has since installed fiber-optic communication systems to counter future use of SEADS.

When US, British and French warships hurried to Burmese waters to deliver relief supplies to victims of Cyclone Nargis in the Irrawaddy delta in 2007, the regime refused them entry. However, it discovered it could barely mobilize naval ships and jet fighters, let alone its air defense system.

During their visit to Pyongyang six months after Cyclone Nargis, Shwe Mann and top leaders were given a briefing on air defense and radar systems to be installed in southern Burma.

According to Maung Aung Myoe, the Tatmadaw has acquired Man-Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS) for defense, while jet fighters and missiles would be used for both the middle and outer defense zones. The new air defense systems have been deployed in Naypyidaw and along the Thai-Burmese border.

The author said the Burmese armed forces appeared to focus on two different types of air defense missions in Burma: the air defense of key political and military installations, and battlefield air defense.

Tunnel Vision

Burmese leaders are thought to be seriously considering hiding the new radar systems and missiles. Since the early 2000s, The Irrawaddy has reported rumors and news of tunnel building in central Burma.

Military sources said new tunnels around Naypyidaw and in central Burma would be used as bunkers for the central command, and to hide missiles, jet fighters and radar equipment. The secret report revealed that Burma is interested in building yet more underground facilities.

Late Prime Minister Gen Soe Win, a protégé of Than Shwe, was interested in tunnel warfare, and officers who attended the National Defense College studied tunnel warfare and defense. However, it is thought that the Chinese, who remain a major arms supplier to the junta, have counseled that tunnel warfare is less relevant in modern warfare.

Though photos of tunnels published in exiled and international media drew international attention recently, their purpose has to be verified. Currently there are 12 hydropower projects scheduled for construction. These include the Paunglaung hydropower project near the new capital, and the largest in the country, the Ye Ywa hydropower project 50 km (31 miles) southeast of Mandalay.

It is difficult to distinguish whether the tunnels were for military purposes, or for hydropower, until unsolicited photographs and video of a tunnel construction site were posted on news web sites including the Democratic Voice of Burma, Yale Global online and The Irrawaddy.

It is safe to assume that some of the tunnels are for military purposes and are now operational. The secret report mentioned the building of command posts in the tunnels, and it verifies that the regime plans to build underground military facilities in Shan State and central Burma.

Some Burmese defense analysts think the junta has already prepared emergency escape routes in Naypyidaw in case of war. Burma's army leaders are not planning to flee, however, but to fight back by using guerilla warfare and launching a "people's war" in central Burma or from Shan State. Should such a war break out, the regime also plans to mobilize its mass organizations--the fire brigades and civil services--to defend the nation. (See: The Irrawaddy "Than Shwe's The Art of War" Mar--Apr, 2009 - Volume 17 No.2)

During the 1988 student uprising in Rangoon that ended with a bloody military crackdown, a US fleet was spotted near Burmese waters. Than Shwe and hard-line leaders must feel that having missiles and air defense systems will make foreign powers more wary, giving them cause to hesitate before they send warships close to Burma's shores again.